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Abstract 
My thesis explores the role played by form in our experience of objects of consciousness 
as art.  In doing so, I look at the concept of form as it was understood by prominent 
philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, as well as form in Immanuel Kant’s aesthetics 
in The Critique of the Power of Judgment. My method is phenomenological and rooted in 
my experience of making and writing about art, as a student of studio art and of 
philosophy. To connect philosophical understandings of form to the experience of art in a 
way reflective of my experience, I show the connection between and influence on art 
critical understandings of form by philosophical understandings of form. In particular, I 
focus on Modernist formalism as Clive Bell, Roger Fry and Clement Greenberg 
articulated it. Modernist formalism played a role in the teaching style and content of art 
studio classes I attended. The role of form in our experience of art was problematized by 
Conceptual Art, which movement also deeply impacted the teaching style and content of 
my studio art classes. The tension I experienced between these two movements in art and 
its criticism led to my interest in this topic and informed my choice to limit the scope of 
my investigation to Modernist formalism and Conceptual Art. In particular, I focus on 
philosophically trained Conceptual Artists such as Adrian Piper and Joseph Kosuth. 
Changes in the way art was made and understood impacted the understanding of the 
concept of form not only for art critics, but also for philosophers. I include contemporary 
philosophical discussions of form by Bernard Freydberg and Rudolphe Gasché to show 
the movement and interrelatedness between art and philosophy about the concept of 
form. The conclusion I reach is that form in our experience of art is constructive of that 
experience if our consciousness of art objects is conceived of as an engaged, rather than 
disinterested. My rejection of disinterest in favour of engagement is adapted from Arnold 
Berleant’s account of the aesthetic experience. I retain a place for the object as it is given, 
using H.J. Gadamer’s terms “changing” and “unchanging aspects.” The object’s 
properties are its unchanging aspects while the shifting contextual ground on which art as 
an experience is built is the changing aspect. I conclude that form is a way of seeing that 
requires both of these aspects.  
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Introduction 
My thesis explores the role played by form in our experience of visual art from my perspective 
as a student of philosophy and as a visual artist. From my perspective, form brings together two 
aspects of our experience of art: the role of the viewing subject in the experience of an object as 
art, an experience which is contextual, and the more general phenomenal experience of an object 
of consciousness. In art criticism, understandings of the concept of form contribute to the context 
in which art objects are made, experienced and interpreted. The understanding of the concept of 
form in art criticism on which I focus in this thesis underpins the formalist theory of art critic 
Clement Greenberg, who was deeply influenced by Immanuel Kant’s Critique of the Power of 
Judgment. I contrast this Modernist formalist concept of form with the anti-formal and anti-
aesthetic art made by Conceptual artists in the mid 1960s, a period during which Modernist 
formalism as an art movement began to lose its appeal to the art critical audience. 
From my perspective, an art object’s form is what is given to consciousness as its object 
in our experience of art. The form of an art object is also constructed by our consciousness; form 
in this sense is given as an act of consciousness. As an act of consciousness, art is conditioned by 
the life-world of the artist, which includes her understanding of art criticism and the art historical 
context in which her art practice is situated. The art object does not directly represent an artist’s 
life-world, but rather the object gains meaning through the viewer’s life-world. So, we may have 
an understanding of the context and the set of rules that guided an art object’s making, but we 
cannot move from this understanding to an experience of the artist’s life-world or intent. We are 
left with the unchanging aspects of the art object itself as an object of consciousness and with our 
experience of the object as art that contains the possibility of meaning.  
While examining the role form plays in our experience of art, I look at the impact of the 
Conceptual art movement on the concept of form, since this movement challenged assumptions 
made by Modernist formalists in ways that relate directly to our experience of art and to my own 
understanding of the concept of form. One of the primary assumptions that underpin Modernist 
formalism is that we may experience art simply with a naked eye. The works of Conceptual 
artists challenge this assumption because these works are not primarily perceptual. This is to say, 
conceptual art relies (often very heavily) on some knowledge or understanding on the part of the 
spectator. Conceptual art, therefore, relies less on our ability to perceive the object and 
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experience its formal properties than it does on the intelligible context that allows us to 
experience an installation or exhibit as art. From my perspective, Conceptual art shows us that 
the viewer plays an active role in forming her experience of an object as that of an object of art. 
If the viewer plays an active rather than a passive role in this experience, then Conceptual art 
also shows us something about consciousness and what it is required if we are to see actively, 
rather than passively through naked eyes. I take the position that consciousness is what Arnold 
Berleant calls "engaged"1 and that it is because we actively form our experience of objects of 
consciousness that we experience art. Form in art, from this perspective, is the form of an 
object’s unchanging aspects as well as the changing aspects that characterize our own life-world.  
To make my position clear, I include in the present study a discussion of both the art 
historical and the philosophical elements of the problem. In chapter one, I first present a 
historical overview of Modernist formalism and its proponents, followed by a short historical 
account of Conceptual art as a movement that challenged some of the assumptions that 
underpinned formalism. I then discuss the ways in which the concept of form as it was used in 
philosophy influenced the art critical use of the concept of form. Conceptual art’s rejection of 
form demonstrates the impact of formalism on art making, and an analysis of the art produced by 
Conceptualism shows that form persists as a key element in our experience of Conceptual art 
despite the fact that its makers (often) deny its presence. My aim, then, is to show that form 
should not be the sole starting point of our experience of art, nor should it be thought of as the 
condition that makes the experience of art possible. I wish to show that Modernist formalism 
failed precisely because it sought to reduce art and our experience of it to form. On the other 
hand, the theoretical assumptions of Conceptual art reduced our experience of art to that of the 
idea, embodied by objects, installations and performance. In both cases, reductionism leads to an 
account of our experience that neglects the complexities of art and the reasons we experience art 
objects as different from other objects. My intention is to rehabilitate form in art from the 
damage done by the rigidity and reductionism of Modernist formalism, on the one hand, and by 
Conceptual art’s wholesale rejection of it, on the other.   
1 “[T]he argument of this book rests on such an account of aesthetic experience, and on appreciation as engaged, not 
disinterested.” – Arnold Berleant, Sensibility and Sense: The Aesthetic Transformation of the Human World, on pg. 
61.
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The first chapter is a condensed treatment of form in philosophy and art criticism, 
showing the ways in which the concept of form in the former influenced theory and practice in 
the latter. My goal in chapter one is to show the continuity of the philosophical discussion of 
form from Plato, Aristotle and Kant to the primary assumptions of Modernist formalism and the 
art that was made during the period generally referred to as Modernism (late 1800s – late 1960s), 
particularly during Clement Greenberg’s Modernism. I build my own position on accounts of 
form in Aristotle, Plato and Kant’s work as Rudolphe Gasché, Bernard Freydberg and Theodore 
Edward Uehling interpret it, focusing on the ways that form has been drawn from a general 
philosophical context into art criticism, from Modernism to contemporary art. Each of these 
authors interprets the concept of form in convergent ways, drawing primarily from Kant, in the 
case of Gasché and Uehling, and from Plato and Aristotle (as well as Kant) in Freydberg’s case.  
The importance of Kantian aesthetics to contemporary art is, Gasché argues, due to the 
fact that Kant was interested in beauty and in providing an account of aesthetic judgment, rather 
than an account of artistic judgment or beauty of, specifically, art objects. “One may wonder,” 
Gasché asks, “whether it is not precisely because Kant’s aesthetics is an aesthetics of natural 
beauty, rather than of artwork, that it is important for the understanding of the fine arts, and 
particularly of modern and postmodern art, which are the exclusive concern of post-Kantian 
aesthetics” (Gasché, 2003, p. 3). Gasché’s interpretation of form in his book The Idea of Form: 
Rethinking Kant’s Aesthetics is informed by a specific reading of the Critique of Judgement that 
is, although not explicitly, connected to the unique theoretical climate of contemporary art. Thus, 
Gasché’s reading of the Third Critique and of the concept of form greatly influenced my own 
interpretation of form in visual art.  
Freydberg’s Provocative Form in Plato, Kant, Nietzsche (and Others), although it 
ultimately makes a case for the author’s own unique interpretation of form as "provocative," 
provides an account and interpretation of the meaning of form throughout the history of 
philosophy. I have restricted my use of Freydberg to the sections on Plato, Aristotle and Kant. 
He claims at the outset, “This notion of form reflects the experience of striving to know that 
which is fixed and immutable” (Freydberg, 2000, p. 15), which aligns with my own initial 
impression of what it is that both art critics and philosophers are after when they talk about form.  
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Theodore E. Uehling’s The Notion of Form in Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment 
provides an accessible and coherent account of form that is widely referenced by Kant scholars. 
The notion of form that Uehling defends is an understanding of the form of a sensible object, 
about which Uehling writes, “The form of an object of sense is those spatial and temporal 
relationships exhibited by a synthesized manifold.” (Uehling, 1971, p. 58). The notion of 
objective form is the theoretical foundation of Modernist formalism. My interest in Uehling’s 
account of form in Kant’s Critique of Judgement is the clarity it brings to the close relationship 
between the art critical notion of objective form and Kantian form. The notion of form as 
objective underpinned Modernist formalism as an art critical movement. Objective form as a 
concept played an implicit role in the instruction of art classes I took as a student, in that we were 
taught that certain rules of design held as objective, not subjective. Modernist formalism also 
developed from two very Kantian assumptions about art: 1) art is autonomous 2) art is 
fundamentally aesthetic.2 Kantian aesthetics and the concept of form as objective justify the 
position that art is autonomous from social and political concerns, so that an art object need not 
represent something to be beautiful. If the beauty of art is not in the scenes it represents, then the 
disinterested pleasure felt by its viewer is in response to an art object’s form.  
In chapter two, I shift focus from the historical and theoretical context of form in visual 
art to our experience of art as an object of consciousness that embodies meaning. As an object of 
consciousness, art exists as the appearance of a material form. For Kant, the forms of nature 
could be judged aesthetically because they were not purposive, so our intuitions of natural form 
were not immediately subsumed by the concepts of the understanding. Objects that are made by 
a person satisfy a purpose and, as such, are guided by the conceptual understanding of what an 
object is or should be. To perceive art as though it were nature, so that it is not seen as purposive, 
one must adopt a disinterested disposition toward the art object. In studio art classes (at least in 
my own studio drawing classes) students are taught to distance themselves from, or to adopt a 
disposition of disinterest toward, the object they are drawing. For instance, by viewing an object 
such as a chair disinterestedly, the artist may see the form – the line and shape – of the object 
rather than its concept, or how one would expect a chair to appear. I found this technique 
particularly effective when creating loosely representational work that had an effortless and 
2 I am drawing from Section III of Noël Carroll’s Art in Three Dimensions, particularly the discussion in this section 
called “The Artworld Declares its Independence,” on p. 145. 
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semi-abstracted appearance. The experience of making art while directed by disinterest rather 
than by an interest in representational accuracy involves the same act of bracketing conceptual 
associations as the experience of perceiving art disinterestedly.  
As a student of philosophy, I was initially drawn to formalism because I experienced the 
distance between the consciousness of an object and its concept while drawing in the way I was 
taught during studio art classes. The experience of drawing in this way taught me that, by 
creating a distance between the object I saw and the concept I would normally associate with it, I 
could come close to a perceptual experience that felt naked and direct. I have since come to see 
this distance as less a measure of objectivity than a sort of cultured blindness that is learned and 
requires the purposive bracketing of specific concerns from one’s consciousness. The 
implications of this realization on form and its place in our experience of art left me pessimistic, 
if I were to uphold my initial position on form in art. Chapter two is devoted, therefore, to 
making sense of the relationship between our experience of art and our consciousness of objects, 
the latter being affected by our conceptual understandings, if true disinterest cannot be achieved.  
While exploring perspectives on our experience of art that address form, even if 
indirectly, yet reject disinterest, I studied (parts of) of H.G. Gadamer’s Truth and Method, and 
Arnold Berleant’s Sensibility and Sense: The Aesthetic Transformation of the Human World and 
The Aesthetic Field: A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience. Gadamer claims an unchanging 
aspect of any art object persists, meaning “the aesthetic quality of a work of art is based on 
structural laws and on a level of embodied form and shape that ultimately transcend all the 
limitations of its historical origin or cultural context” (Gadamer, 1998, p. xxx). Gadamer did, 
however, leave room for those changing aspects that are determined by context and the viewing 
subject. In conjunction with Gadamer’s account of an aesthetic experience, Arnold Berleant’s 
aesthetics, and his view of consciousness as engaged rather than disinterested, provide a model 
for understanding form in the experience of art without rejecting the subjectively determined 
aspects of our experience of an object as art. 
In chapter three, I focus on strengthening my case for the position according to which our 
experience of art can be reduced neither to changing nor to unchanging aspects of the art object. 
In Truth and Method, Gadamer claimed that the autonomy of art allowed persons to encounter 
themselves in the world through the experience of a universal whole rather than the experience 
of uniformity (Gadamer, 1998, p. 49, 66-68).  Yet, Modernist formalists were interested in 
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achieving uniformity in our experience of art making and viewing. The belief that uniformity 
could be achieved at all required not only formalism’s founding assumptions of art’s autonomy 
and purely aesthetic purpose (Carroll, 2010, p. 145-163), but also required that we be able to 
perceive objects in isolation from context, knowledge or understanding. Conceptual Art as a 
movement challenged the assumptions underpinning Modernist formalism by showing that the 
art object could be dematerialized and thereby essentially reduced to an idea. The dematerialized 
art object culminated in exhibits that consisted of an empty art gallery such as Yves Klein’s 1958 
exhibit Le Vide, which consisted of an empty gallery, and Art and Language’s 1972 Air 
Conditioning Show, which consisted of an empty, air-conditioned gallery3. In such installations 
the idea that is intended to be taken as art cannot be communicated, and certainly cannot be 
experienced, in the absence of a contextual frame, which I argue includes the physical space and 
any of the material aspects that are present during the exhibit.  
In chapter three, I discuss in greater depth the Conceptual artists I introduced in the 
historical overview of chapter one; Joseph Kosuth, Adrian Piper and Sol Le Witt. The challenges 
posed to formalist assumptions about our experience of art by philosophically trained Conceptual 
artists like Joseph Kosuth and Adrian Piper are the focus of this chapter and underpin my project 
as a whole. The Conceptual Art movement is unique as a point of connection between art and 
philosophy in part because the artists I consider in my thesis were trained philosophers: Adrian 
Piper received a PhD from Harvard under the supervision of John Rawls,4 and Joseph Kosuth 
studied philosophy at the New School.5 By making explicit the challenges posed to formalist 
assumptions about our experience of art, I am interested primarily in showing that form cannot 
be so easily dismissed from our experience of even an empty gallery, since form remains 
encountered through its absence. I also explore the possibility of experiencing an installation 
through only its theoretical artist’s or curatorial statement, then discuss what we can learn from 
the empty gallery and the absence of form. The connection between form and the absence of 
3 A series of photos from Klein’s Le Vide can be viewed here: 
http://www.yveskleinarchives.org/works/works13_us.html 
while Art & Language’s Air Conditioning Show has become difficult to find online (its former home on the Tate’s 
site has had the images stripped - http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/art--language-terry-atkinson-born-1939-
michael-baldwin-born-1945-air-conditioning-show--p80069), an archive of photos from similar empty gallery 
shows, including one photo of Air Conditioning Show can be viewed here: http://search.it.online.fr/covers/?m=1958 
4 http://adrianpiper.com/biography.shtml 
5 http://www.skny.com/artists/joseph-kosuth/ 
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form is important to establish if I want to show that form may have any role at all in the 
experience of art – an experience that can be seen as largely detached from the physical.  
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Chapter One – Historical Overview 
1.1 Modernist Formalism 
Modernist art critical formalism developed during the late 19th and early 20th century through the 
writing of Clive Bell and Roger Fry of the Bloomsbury group, the two primary authors of 
Modernist formalism. In his influential work Art, published in 1914, Bell proposed a theory of 
art that posited a work’s internal structure, which he called “significant form,” as the determining 
ground of any aesthetic judgment of art. An art object such as a painting or sculpture may have 
either representational content or be entirely abstract, but it must possess significant form if it is 
to be called art. Bell applied the concept of significant form as a means of establishing the 
necessary conditions for an ontology of art, as well as developing a theory of aesthetic 
appreciation and judgment that centered on the idea of significant form. By “significant form,” 
Bell meant; the properties of an art object that do not refer to anything outside the frame, e.g. 
representational content, authorial intentions, or art historical context. Bell did not bother to 
elucidate why significant form should differ from mere, or even insignificant, form, nor did he 
discuss why only art objects contain significant form, since he took this type of form and its 
necessity to the judgment of art as a self-evident foundation on which he could build his theory. 
Bell wanted to show that art could be judged objectively if we look only at those properties of a 
work that are aesthetic and formal. Significant form is the property of an object that can be 
experienced as art and nothing else: In his book Since Cezanne, Bell claimed that, “A rose is not 
beautiful because it is like something else. Neither is a work of art” (Bell, 1929, p. 40).  
Bell’s conception of significant form was important to the development of a modernism 
in visual art insofar as it provided theoretical grounds to justify the appreciation of the 
“primitive” crafts of Non-European and in most cases colonized peoples, thereby expanding the 
Western gaze and devaluing popular representational styles of painting. Formalism at this stage 
was not only a theory of art but also a social and political reaction against the ideal of inevitable 
stages of progress and colonial hubris.6 The Bloomsbury group thought that the visual culture of 
its time, which was exemplified by the work of representational painters like William Powell 
Frith, was stagnant and pandered to an audience that wanted art objects to reflect its own vision 
6 Bloomsbury formalism was taken “up … to neutralize two contemporary poisons: Germanic notions of historical 
progress and Enlightenment denigrations of “the savage” (Jones, 2005, p. 129). 
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of civilization. The art made by non-Western cultures was, at this time, an artifact to be studied 
scientifically but not appreciated aesthetically because, to the Western eye, such art lacked the 
sort of representational sophistication that was required by a culture that had evolved beyond 
making decorative and utilitarian objects. By seeking what was essential to the aesthetic value of 
art in compositional structure and form, rather than in the meaningful and representational 
content of a work, the Bloomsbury formalists transcended the politics of representation, 
supplanting it with a visual plane on which all cultures and all ways of seeing could be unified.  
While Bell’s account of formalism was primarily ontological, Roger Fry’s interpretation 
of formalism in Vision and Design focused on the response of the viewer to art objects, and the 
experience of making art. Fry was a well-trained, prolific and accomplished painter, as well as an 
author and art critic. Fry’s interpretation of formalism is less a theory of art that requires 
significant form, than it is an analysis of consciousness and perception. Fry posits a distinction 
between two ways of seeing; the actual and imaginary. The former demands a set of responsive 
actions, the carrying out of which enables our survival, while the latter creates a distance 
between an event and the responsive action in that event we envision ourselves taking. The 
distance between an event and our imagined act leads us to “that disinterested intensity of 
contemplation” (Fry, 1961, p. 32), which is characteristic of both the act of making and of 
viewing art. That the intensity of contemplation in the imaginary way of seeing is characteristic 
of our experience of art means, Fry claimed, “Art, then, is an expression and a stimulus of this 
imaginative life, which is separated from actual life by the absence of responsive action” (Fry, 
1961, p. 26). As an artist, Fry was not a formalist who aimed to produce an objective, significant 
form but to stimulate in the audience the imaginative life and disinterested contemplation that 
accompanies a separation from the actual.  
Fry appears, at this point, to have little in common with Bell at all. This appearance is lost 
past the starting point of each version of Bloomsbury formalism. Fry moves toward the same 
theory of aesthetic judgment as Bell, because he relies on similar assumptions about the 
experience of art. Both Fry and Bell, although not entirely dismissive of representational content, 
were dismissive of representational norms, about which Fry claimed, “So long as representation 
was regarded as the end of art, the skill of the artist and his proficiency in this particular feat of 
representation was regarded with an admiration which was in fact mainly non-aesthetic” (Fry, 
1961, p. 20). If the true aesthetic properties of art objects were to become apparent, art must be 
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liberated from social norms governing its representational content. Once liberated, art objects 
could become autonomous rather than serving communicative, or representational, ends. 
Autonomous art would not engage the actual but rather the imaginary, so that the person making 
or viewing art would be drawn into the contemplative intensity of the piece. The formalist 
movement in which Fry and Bell participated had, claimed Fry, “render[ed] the artist intensely 
conscious of the aesthetic unity of the work of art, but singularly naïve and simple as regards 
other considerations” (Fry, 1961, p. 20). By "other considerations," Fry meant the 
representational content of an art object. The problem of mistaking naïveté for disinterested 
contemplation is that the Bloomsbury group was, then, blind to its own ethnocentrism,7 which 
contributed to the Bloomsbury formalists’ failure to cope with later challenges to their theory of 
art. 
After Bell and Fry, influential art critic Clement Greenberg developed a more 
theoretically sophisticated and philosophically informed formalist theory of art, influenced by 
Marxism and Kantian aesthetics, which I refer to throughout as Modernist formalism. Greenberg 
was an active art critic in New York during the mid 1900s and was one of the first critics to take 
the work of Jackson Pollock seriously. Through his critical engagement with the artistic avant-
garde of his time, he effectively curated Modernist painting as an art movement. While the 
Bloomsbury group reacted against the notion that history had a set, linear path guided by 
progress, Greenberg embraced this notion, perhaps due to the influence of Marxism on his 
writing. Bell’s formalism, although likewise perfectionist and reductionist, did not declare itself 
the end of art history, while this tone is evident in the later, modernist version championed by 
Greenberg. Greenberg also proposed the idea of medium specificity,8 which stated that each 
7 The Bloomsbury formalists championed African sculpture for the reasons I claim, but they did not succeed in 
neutralizing what Caroline Jones referred to as the “two contemporary poisons,” one of which is the notion of 
progress by which some civilizations may be considered more advanced than others (Jones, 2006, p. 127-144). The 
bizarre reverence of Bell’s essay “Negro Sculpture” reveals the core of his beliefs about non-Western art. In this 
essay, Bell moves from extolling the artistic virtues of African sculpture, as “so rich in artistic qualities that it is 
entitles to a place beside (“the capital achievements of the greatest schools” of fine art) (Bell, 1929, p. 115), to 
declaring that “The savage gift is precarious because it is unconscious,” and, further: “At the root of this artistic self-
consciousness lies the defect which accounts for the essential inferiority of Negro to the very greatest art. Savages 
lack self-consciousness and the critical sense because they lack intelligence. And because they lack intelligence they 
are incapable of profound conceptions. Beauty, taste, quality, and skill, all are here; but profundity of vision is not. 
And because they cannot grasp complicated ideas they fail generally to create organic wholes.  … Also, they lack 
originality.” (Bell, 1929, p. 116-117) 
8 In Avant-Garde and Kitsch (Greenberg, The Partisan Review, 1939) Greenberg writes that abstraction in visual art 
is the result of medium specificity: “In turning his attention away from subject matter of common experience, the 
poet or artist turns it in upon the medium of his own craft.”  
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artistic medium must become internally critical of its own use. This is to say that a work 
rendered in any particular medium must refer to only itself. A painting must only be about paint. 
For Greenberg, the final goal of art was to become self-critical and inward looking; to remove its 
dependence on the outside world and become a self-perpetuating creator of visual culture that 
need be neither supported by a moneyed elite nor consumed by an uninitiated public.9  
As a philosophically informed critique of the value and ontological status of art, 
Modernist formalism is open to two criticisms that Greenberg did not adequately address and 
that relate to my project as a whole. First, Greenberg applied Modernist formalism as a 
theoretical guide to the production of art and to the process of identifying the formal properties 
of art objects, on the assumption that only the formal properties of an object can be experienced 
as art. Such an experience would be uniform, which is a requirement that Greenberg adapted 
from Kant’s concept of sensus communis, and the experience should be objective. To achieve 
uniformity, a subject’s apprehension of an art object must be the pure perception of its formal 
properties, with no consideration given to any peripheral concerns such as context or 
representational content. Grounding the judgment of art in objective form, while assuming the 
purity of perception, does not allow for difference in taste, since this would amount to a subject’s 
having either perceived a different object, or the same object incorrectly. This is a simplistic and 
reductive notion of judgment and the role played by perception in the apprehension of art 
objects. The reductionist notion of form gained a foothold in art criticism through the work of 
formalist critics and the art associated with it. From my perspective, Greenberg abstracted the 
notion of an objective form and allowed it to be representative of something pure, both in 
production and perception, which affirmed the purity of an artist’s vision, while steadfastly 
avoiding any examination of the validity of formalism’s assumptions with respect to the 
experience of art.  
A second problem is that the extremes demanded by formalist theory, as the manifesto of 
Modernism, are identified closest with abstract expressionist painting. Ironically, the art that 
submitted to these demands can be understood as the product of social and historical forces that 
9 “Retiring from the public altogether, the avant-garde poet or artist sought to maintain the high level of his art by 
both narrowing and raising it to the expression of an absolute in which all relativities and contradictions would be 
either resolved or beside the point. "Art for art's sake" and "pure poetry" appear, and subject matter or content 
becomes something to be avoided like a plague” (Greenberg, 1939, p. 3). 
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allowed and encouraged formalists to pursue Modernist formalism to its logical conclusion. A 
gentler interpretation of modernist formalism attempted to show that, if art is autonomous and 
fundamentally aesthetic, and the experience of the aesthetic is not entirely subjective, then our 
experience of art must be in some sense universal because it would be – if not entirely, at least 
primarily – the objective experience of a universally apprehensible form. Form in a less extreme 
and more flexible Modernist formalism might have provided a means of understanding our 
experience of art as an experience10 of its object, not by strictly identifying the experience of art 
with the object’s form, but by recognizing the role of form as universalizing and as tied to the 
irreducibility of art to its concept. 
The two problems I have introduced are grounded in the fundamental assumptions of 
Modernist formalism: first, art is autonomous and, second, art is fundamentally aesthetic (Carroll 
2010, p. 145-163). Both assumptions are required by Greenbergian formalism since art that is not 
kitsch is art that is free from market forces and cannot be easily subsumed by interests that are 
not aesthetic. Art that is good is, therefore, autonomous from its social and historical conditions 
and, because of this freedom, fundamentally aesthetic. The contemporary and historical viewer 
should apprehend the same form and experience the work uniformly if these two conditions are 
met. The uniformity of experience is, however, not of the formal properties, many of which 
require knowledge of composition to see at all. The art that Greenberg championed was no more 
autonomous than any of its representational predecessors. The abstracted pure form of art 
objects, e.g. abstract expressionist paintings, relies on a purity of vision that is, in actuality rather 
than theory, neither simplistic nor reductive, but is tied to a hierarchy of cultural considerations. 
Visual purity, as a formalist concept, depends on knowledge of what is and is not kitsch or avant-
garde. It is attached not only to perception, but to knowledge and understanding.  
Art’s autonomy from market, social, and other contextual concerns, draws an implicit 
equivocation between a sort of Platonic Form and the Avant-garde art object, as representing 
nothing but itself and existing, therefore, as a copy of nothing. The problem of Bloomsbury 
formalism’s blind ethnocentrism is present in a more sophisticated package in Greenbergian 
formalism. Greenberg assumed that the autonomy of an art object from concerns of intent, 
context, and content, left it pure and able to exist as a medium specific and internally self-critical 
10 “By excluding nothing on principle, by adopting no pre-determined limits, any thing or any situation may become 
an occasion for aesthetic experience. … Universality, however, does not imply uniformity.” (Berleant, 2010, p. 46) 
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whole. The self-referential purity of autonomous art meant that it had shaken the mimetic curse 
and become the form of which all representational art had been but a copy. The mistake in this 
rested, as Plato would have seen, in the assumption that purity of this type can exist in an object. 
Greenberg’s autonomy of art was not the autonomy or purity of the art object, but the autonomy 
and purity of the critical eye.  
1.2 Conceptual Art 
Conceptual art as a movement gained momentum in the 1960s,11 and produced largely anti-
aesthetic and anti-formal art. Conceptual art can be read as reacting against the restrictions which 
Modernist formalist art critics and practitioners placed on making and experiencing art. Art 
theorist Caroline Jones (2005, p. 305) claims “Artist-writers emerging in the mid-1960s cut their 
teeth on Greenbergian formalism quite literally, if only to surface its conundrums.” These artists 
included, as Jones puts it, “an entire “post-Art and Culture” [a collection of Greenberg’s essays] 
generation that put Greenberg’s ideas to the test” and practiced a “maddeningly logical pursuit of 
Greenberg’s systemic and structural modernism [that] had the ultimate effect of radically 
undermining his tyranny of the eye.” The tyranny of the Modernist formalist’s eye requires that 
art be fundamentally aesthetic and autonomous of any consideration beyond what is perceived. 
Conceptual art demonstrated, through our experience of art, the necessity of the idea to our 
experience of an object as art. By revealing that the formalist eye was in fact theoretically 
informed rather than pure, artists of this generation exposed both the limits placed on the 
experience of art by constraints of medium specificity and gallery space, and the indefensibility 
of the formalist assumption of perceptual purity. As both a critical and productive art movement, 
Conceptual art put forward two primary, and anti-formalist, assumptions: first, art as a concept is 
fundamentally tied to its social and historical conditions, and, second, the relevant properties of 
art as an object are not aesthetic.12 Alexander Alberro, in the introduction to Art after Conceptual 
art (2006, p. 14), claimed “Conceptualism was pivotal in breaking art from the constraints of 
self-containment … [which] allowed art to intersect with an expanded range of social life.” 
Conceptual art pushed against definitions of art, its value and judgment, and its relationship with 
art criticism and philosophy. Peter Osborne said Conceptual art as a movement:  
11 Marcel Duchamp can be credited with having created the first piece of Conceptual art with Fountain in 1917, 
Conceptual art as a movement did not truly begin till much later. 
12 These are assumptions that I am drawing from the work, written and otherwise, of Conceptual artists Joseph 
Kosuth, Sol LeWitt and Adrian Piper.  
14	  
“is not just another particular kind of art, in the sense of a further specification of an 
existing genus, but an attempt at a fundamental redefinition of art as such, a 
transformation in the relationship of sensuousness to conceptuality within the ontology of 
the artwork which challenges its definition as the object of a specifically ‘aesthetic’ (that 
is, ‘non-conceptual’) or quintessentially ‘visual’ experience” (Osborne in Newman and 
Bird, 1999, p. 48).  
If the aesthetic properties and the conceptual content of an art object are mutually exclusive, and 
the aesthetic properties of art are sensible properties of the object, then Conceptual art, at its most 
extreme, need no longer be a physical object at all without surrendering its status as art (with 
only conceptual content). The project to reject the aesthetic properties of art, if those properties 
are identical to the object that allows us a “quintessentially ‘visual’ experience,” must conclude 
with dematerialization of art, for Conceptual art as a movement to have reached its logical 
conclusion. If this conclusion can be reached, Conceptual art will have shown that any 
assumptions made about our experience of art as perceptual cannot be supported. However, from 
my perspective, the impact of Conceptual art has been not the substantiation of anti-aesthetic, 
anti-formal and immaterial art, but rather it has made possible a form of rematerialized art, 
represented by practices that expand art as a human endeavour beyond its sanctioned gallery 
space and modes of production. As rematerialized, the form of an art object becomes located in 
the distance between the object’s unchanging aspects and those changing and contextual aspects 
that are brought to the experience of art by us. In addition to expanding the practice of art beyond 
its Modernist boundaries, Conceptual artists attempted to make use of their philosophical 
understanding of and, in several cases, formal training in philosophy as an artistic medium of 
sorts.  
Conceptual artist and writer Joseph Kosuth studied philosophy and was influenced by the 
work of A.J. Ayer. Kosuth uses language, as the raw material of his ideas, to make art. In writing 
about art, Kosuth advocated an extreme dematerialization of the art object, to reveal more 
completely the concept that is the art. He claimed, as quoted by Osborne (in Newman and Bird, 
1999, p. 56), “All art (after Duchamp) is conceptual (in nature) because art only exists 
conceptually.” I interpret Kosuth to mean that we do not experience art as an object of perception 
but as the intelligible form of an idea that we understand to be subsumed under the concept of 
art. I do not see art as either perceptual or conceptual. From my perspective, Kosuth is right 
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about our experience of art as conceptual only if the perceptual aspects of his work are also 
considered valuable, indeed essential to his practice.  
From my perspective, taking into consideration the perspectives of Modernist formalism, 
Conceptual art and my own art training, art is a human endeavour, the making of which requires 
us to exercise our full range of human ability; the manipulation of material in response to a sense 
that we have of its possible shape, a reflective awareness of one’s self and one’s place in the 
world and how this may be communicated; art allows us the ability to realize that we can have a 
subjective experience of an object. An art object is, however, apprehended as such only because 
we accept that there is a relationship between the material object, and, as Picasso claimed, the 
idea that art exists as “a living creature, undergoing the changes that daily life imposes upon us,” 
and is a creature that  “lives only through him who looks at it.”13 The life of an art object requires 
a subject for whom it exists as an object that is about something just as the experience of art 
requires both the perceptual and contextual aspects. 
Kosuth’s installations are an example of Conceptual art as a reaction to Modernist 
formalism. Appreciation of an installation by Kosuth, such as the One and Three14 series, 
requires not a pure and formal, but a philosophically informed eye. The idea and the language 
associated with its communication are, in a narrow sense, identical to both the mode of 
production and end product of Kosuth’s work. As anti-formal and anti-aesthetic, the success of 
Kosuth’s art is its ability to communicate an idea. Since the majority of his installations can be 
literally read, they could hardly fail to communicate unless the viewer is not literate in the 
language used. It remains the case, however, that Kosuth’s austere installations are objects of 
perception and open to experience in the absence of the idea he intends that they show. From my 
perspective, the mobility of thought in art making does not lead determinately from a concept to 
an art object for the artist. In the making of art, thought and material become fused: The form of 
an art object is the skeletal structure of its experience by others, in conjunction with the meaning 
that is part of a picture’s life through a viewer’s subjective intervention. The idea, as intended by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “The picture is not thought out and determined beforehand; rather while it is being made it follows the mobility of 
thought. Finished, it changes further, according to the condition of him who looks at it. A picture lives its life like a 
living creature, undergoing the changes that daily life imposes upon us. That is natural, since a picture lives only 
through him who looks at it”  - Pablo Picasso (Berleant, 1970, p. 97).  
14 One and Three Chairs by Joseph Kosuth, 1965, can be seen here: http://www.m 
oma.org/collection/browse_results.php?criteria=O%3AAD%3AE%3A3228&page_number=1&template_id=1&sort
_order=1 
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the artist, cannot be communicated as a determinate concept to the viewer, nor need it be for the 
experience of Kosuth’s One and Three Chairs to be one of art. 
Performance artist Adrian Piper became interested in Conceptual art during the late 
1960’s under the tutelage of Sol LeWitt.15 In addition to learning from LeWitt, Piper’s interest in 
thought, ideas, and the conceptual side of her art practice led her to study philosophy.  She 
became a professional philosopher is 1981, after earning a PhD from Harvard, supervised by 
John Rawls.16 As her philosophical interests developed and eventually became the focus of her 
work, her practise of making art ceased to be consumed by a vision of Conceptual art as a means 
of communicating an idea and she began to use art as a means of critically engaging audiences in 
experiences of racial identity and social hierarchy using a variety of media.17 Piper’s Conceptual 
art was not bound by the same austere and ideological constraints as the work of Kosuth and 
other linguistic artists. Piper’s work illustrates a way through the dogmatism of making art 
dictated by theoretical manifestos. As Peter Osborne points out, in Piper’s “LeWittian strand of 
Conceptualism, it is the infinite plurality of media that the idea of Conceptual art opens up which 
is the point, not the exploration of the idea itself, directly, as art.”18 The starting point of 
experience in Piper’s work, although the ideas it embodies are integral to our understanding of 
it’s meaning, is the materiality of the work itself. Even in the case of her performance pieces,19 
Piper’s work, in its use of visual points of entry and a plurality of media, goes beyond what 
would otherwise be the trivial idea that all real objects have form. Her work showed that our 
experience of art is bound to form in ways that cannot be undone by isolating the concept, but 
can be deepened by the inclusion and direct address of concept and meaning in the making of 
form.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 www.adrianpiper.com/art/sol.shtml 
16 www.adrianpiper.com/biography.shtml 
17 “Adrian Piper, a staunch defender of an inclusive LeWittian Conceptualism, not only went on to study analytic 
philosophy, but became a professional philosopher, while continuing her career as an artist. … For while she used 
(and continues to use) her philosophical work in her art – often making work directly about her philosophical 
reflections – her philosophical interests are not in the concept of art itself, but in the broader metaphysical notions of 
space, time and selfhood, the experience of which her art explores.” (Osborne in Newman and Bird, 1999, p. 54-55) 
18 Osborne in Newman and Bird, 1999, 54-55 
19 Image of Catalysis IV  in which Piper  appeared in public with a wet towel stuffed in her mouth. 
http://www.artperformance.org/article-30223190.html 
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Piper’s mentor, Sol LeWitt,20 rejected language as the starting point of our experience of 
art. LeWitt’s approach to making art was to move beyond the material or linguistic confines of 
the known to bring a different order of thinking and being to light:  
“For LeWitt, … art was a privileged means of access to this other order of facts which 
cannot be accessed directly in the same way. This explains the limited role attributed by 
the text (Paragraphs on Conceptual art) to philosophy: "Conceptual art doesn’t really 
have much to do with mathematics, philosophy or any other mental discipline … The 
philosophy of the work is implicit in the work and is not an illustration of any system of 
philosophy"” (Osborne in Newman and Bird, 1999, p. 53). 
By the implicit "philosophy of the work," LeWitt is referring to the structure he called an art 
object’s "grammar"21 and Carroll calls an art object’s (not explicitly material) form22 . In 
Paragraphs, LeWitt claims, “The idea becomes a machine that makes the art. This kind of art is 
not theoretical or illustrative of theories; it is intuitive, it is involved with all types of mental 
processes and it is purposeless.”23  LeWitt’s assertion that Conceptual art is intuitive, not 
theoretical, and purposeless, sounds resoundingly Kantian and reveals a perspective on 
Conceptual art that is not entirely at odds with the Modernist formalist account of our experience 
of art. The similarity between a Conceptual artist like LeWitt and a Modernist formalist (Kosuth 
and friends are easier to bracket off from the modernists), stems from, I believe, the assumption 
of art as autonomous. In Conceptual art, as Osborne points out, of the “two elements hitherto 
conjoined in the founding conflation of formalist Modernism: aestheticism and autonomy,” the 
aestheticism is rejected while autonomy is retained (Osborne in Newman and Bird, 1999, p. 57).  
In our experience of Conceptual art, the distance between the art object and the viewer is 
complicated because, as Picasso pointed out, the picture lives through the eyes of a viewing 
subject, yet cannot be viewed unless it exists as an object of consciousness. In the experience of 
Conceptual art, the distinction between art as it is experienced and art as an object is collapsed, 
20 Sol LeWitt passed away in 2007. He still has an active artist’s page, including exhibition photos, here: 
http://www.lissongallery.com/#/artists/sol-lewitt/works/ 
21 “When an artist uses a multiple modular method he usually chooses a simple and readily available form. The form 
itself is of very limited importance; it becomes the grammar for the total work. In fact, it is best that the basic unit be 
deliberately uninteresting so that it may more easily become an intrinsic part of the entire work. Using complex 
basic forms only disrupts the unity of the whole. Using a simple form repeatedly narrows the field of the work and 
concentrates the intensity to the arrangement of the form. This arrangement becomes the end while the form 
becomes the means.” LeWitt, Sol. Paragraphs on Conceptual art, Art Forum, June, 1967.     
22 An art object’s form is the “ensemble of choices intended to realize the point or purpose of an artwork” (Carrol, 
Ed. Kieran, p. 78) 
23 LeWitt, Sol. Paragraphs on Conceptual art, Art Forum, June, 1967. 
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not because the two are indistinct but because Conceptual art does not require that the concept 
and the art object bear any necessary relation to one another. There is, then, the object that 
occupies physical space, and the separate idea that is art. Because its assumptions about our 
experience of art are reductive, Conceptual art requires no object of consciousness to represent 
the idea. The work created during this time by artists like Joseph Kosuth and, in particular, 
Beuys and Piper, was both anti-aesthetic and anti-formal because of either its performative 
transience and formlessness,24 or because of its banal and dissociative abstraction, which I find is 
the case in Kosuth’s work. From my perspective as an artist, considering art anti-formal and anti-
aesthetic can produce two different outcomes in practice: art that is to be experienced as an idea, 
in the absence of an object, through the artist’s statement, or art that is to be experienced as an 
idea that is represented by any, and perhaps every, possible object. Neither outcome affirms the 
primary assumption that an idea can be experienced as art, but they do challenge the relevance of 
the object to art’s experience and, therefore, what definition of and role for form we might find 
in art.  
Conceptual art is underpinned by the primary assumption that our experience of art is the 
experience of an idea. From the perspective of an artist, there is no singular and distinct meaning 
of what it is to make or experience art as an idea. The idea experienced as art is of the idea as, 
Sol Le Witt claimed, “a machine that makes the art.” The idea is a machine that leads to an art 
object’s completion; it guides the material decisions made by the artist as a sort of logic or, as Le 
Witt would have said, grammar. This is to say, the idea is a proposition, the truth of which is 
represented by and realized in the art object’s form. From my perspective, we experience art as 
an idea that is indeterminate and in a state of free play, in Kant’s sense. If the experience of art is 
of both its material and intelligible form, and the idea that is an art object’s intelligible form 
remains indeterminate, then our experience of art cannot be reduced to either its perceptual or 
conceptual aspects. Arnold Berleant claims, “In speaking of aesthetics, we must therefore go 
beyond beauty, we must go beyond objects that are pleasing, and focus on our experience of such 
objects, since only through experience can we grasp them” (Berleant, 2010, p. 30). The 
experience of conceptual art challenged the two primary assumptions made by Modernist 
formalists art is fundamentally aesthetic and autonomous) by requiring that we examine the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 I am thinking specifically of performance pieces such as Adrian Piper’s Catalysis III, 1970, and Joseph Beuys’ I 
like America and America likes me, 1974.  
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experience itself as contextual rather than examining the formal properties of an art object. The 
form of an art object, whether we call that object conceptual or, as LeWitt proposed, 
“perceptual,”25 is what we experience as an object of consciousness that is about something. 
Modernist formalism’s assumptions include the necessity of an object to the experience of art, 
which is what LeWitt refers to as perceptual art. To challenge the assumptions made by 
Modernist formalism is also to challenge the necessity of the object. A fully dematerialized 
exhibit that could not be experienced perceptually would demonstrate the successful defeat of 
Modernist formalism’s assumptions. In 1972, the Conceptual art group Art and Language put on 
the Air Conditioning Show, which consisted of an empty, air-conditioned gallery.  Prior to this 
exhibit, in 1958, Yves Klein hosted a similarly empty show, Le Vide, about which he claimed: 
“My paintings are now invisible and I would like to show them in a clear and positive manner.”26 
The boundaries of form can hardly be pushed further, without dissolving the gallery space. The 
space beyond the gallery walls into which this internal space would collapse does not do away 
with form but, rather, reintroduces it. The empty gallery does not challenge form as a starting 
point of our experience of art, it challenges the limits of an audience’s ability to comprehend 
increasingly subtle and specifically contextual signals about the nature and experience of art as it 
is understood by artists. Although the elimination of the art object to reveal a pure concept as art 
was not achieved by A&L or Klein, the possibilities of what constituted an art object were 
expanded by these Conceptual artists’ attempts to do away with the material necessity of art 
objects. The form of any possible object of experience was expanded beyond that of the object 
into the form of an art object’s life, as Picasso understood it, so that our experience of art was no 
longer the disinterested apprehension of visual space within the frame of a work. 
In Modernist formalism, the conjoined elements of aestheticism and autonomy confined 
art to a specific theoretical space that justified the sort of material and compositional constraints 
associated with Greenberg’s formalism, which is primarily represented by the abstract 
expressionists. In contrast, autonomy in Conceptual art refers to the artwork’s freedom from the 
demands of perception and beauty, such that art need not be seen as aesthetic at all. If this logic 
is pushed to its extreme, Conceptual art is free from the constraints of material object-hood. 
Conceptual artists who advocate for or assume this kind of autonomy reduce art’s material 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 LeWitt, Sol. Paragraphs on Conceptual art, Art Forum, June,1967.     
26  Stich, Sidra. Yves Klein. Hayward Gallery. London, 1994. 
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existence to an idea. Modernist formalists used the assumption of art’s autonomy to bracket the 
experience of art from the social and historical world that is part of a viewing subject’s engaged 
consciousness. This modernist position according to which an art object has autonomy, material 
or contextual, is predicated upon a conception of a disinterested viewing subject.27 Autonomy in 
modernism could leave the matter, as it were, intact, while liberating form from it. Conceptual 
art went further and dissolved the material presence of an art object which was a barrier to a 
viewing subject’s direct apprehension of the idea. Autonomy in both Modernist formalism and 
Conceptual art movements reduced our experience of art to either an art object’s perceptual or 
conceptual properties.  
After modernism lost its hold on the making of art that was directed by its own 
theoretical concerns, the breadth of objects that could be actively considered art by artists, art 
critics and audiences widened. Natural and found objects, for instance, could be looked at as art 
if they were presented as such. That the collapse of a theory of art, Modernist formalism, could 
have an impact on the material forms presented as art, which is shown by the work made by 
Conceptual artists, demonstrates what Picasso called the art object’s "life." The life of an art 
object can only exist in and through the presence of a viewing subject; it is that part of her 
experience that is conditioned by context and open to the influence of theory. It is my position 
that the subject who experiences an art object experiences the life of a picture as an inextricable 
part of the object. Berleant refers to this as “experienced meaning,” which he claims “is both 
complex and indistinct. It harbors feeling, tones, bodily stance, mnemonic resonances, 
associations, and intimations that cannot be articulated except, in their own ways, by the arts” 
(Berleant, 2010, p. 30).  
As I have shown, Modernist formalism and Conceptual art adopted opposing positions 
about our experience of art. The assumptions that underpin Conceptual art as a practice imply 
that art exists as an idea so that the presence of an object in the experience of art becomes 
essentially irrelevant, while those underpinning Modernist formalism concern the formal 
properties of an art object, which require the presence of an object that presents these properties. 
Although both art movements adopted opposing assumptions, both also reduce our experience of 
27 “Using precisely that classicist distinction between a normative idea and the ideal of beauty Kant destroys the 
grounds on which the aesthetics of perfection finds everything’s unique, incomparable beauty in its complete 
presence to the senses. Only now can “art” become an autonomous phenomenon. Its task is no longer to represent 
the ideals of nature, but to enable man to encounter himself in nature and in the human, historical world” (Gadamer, 
1998, p. 49) 
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art to a single aspect, either the formal properties or the idea. Although both Modernist 
formalism and Conceptual art provide inspiration for the making of art and inform our 
experience of it, whether we call ourselves formalists, conceptualists or neither, I take the 
position that both movements failed as theories of art because they were reductive. I agree with 
Arnold Berleant that the experience of art is irreducible. He asserts, “Art is not like experience, it 
is not a reflection or an imitation of real life, but it is that very experience in its most direct, 
forceful presence” (Berleant, 1970, p. 114). In considering the experience of art irreducible, 
starting from what Berleant calls an “engaged consciousness” of art objects that embody 
meaning, the object of consciousness need not be separated into the opposing properties of its 
physical presence and its meaning or intent. The engaged consciousness allows us to experience 
an object as art, be it abstract expressionism or Conceptual art, as “that very experience” of the 
object’s life in which we encounter ourselves.28 We may, then, encounter ourselves in the life of 
a later Picasso, one of Rauschenberg’s White Paintings, or Craig-Martin’s An Oak Tree29 without 
diminishing our experience by reducing it to any single aspect.  
In Modernist formalism, form served as a foundational and universalizing source of the 
theoretical stability in a changing environment. Form became central to the work of modernist 
art critics following art’s relatively new status as autonomous and worthy of appreciation for its 
own sake. The loss of control by various authorities (primarily related to church and state) over 
cultural production and interpretation, a process that occurred gradually and was accompanied by 
political, economic and technological developments during the Renaissance, the Reformation 
and the discovery of New World civilizations, and later during the enlightenment and beyond 
provides a historical parallel background argument for art’s social and political autonomy. The 
implications of viewing art as detached from its social and political context expanded into the 
practice of making and criticizing art through the influence of groups like the Bloomsbury 
28 As Gadamer claimed, “life objectifies itself in structures of meaning,” the understanding of which consists in 
“translating the objectifications of life back into” that from which they emerged.  Our knowledge of the object 
cannot consist only of the sensible and entirely disinterested physical form of the object. It must also consist of our 
ability to experience the unique and particular alignment between that object and the forms of life in which we are 
engaged generally. The particular expression of that engagement is experienced through the consciousness of an 
object as art, and as a unique and isolated, singularly occurrent event in time and space. This instance of the 
particular is not of a sort that is subsumable under a universal concept in the Kantian schema: “the relationship of 
life to experience is not that of a universal to a particular. Rather, the unity of experience as determined by its 
intentional content stands in an immediate relationship to the whole, to the totality of life.” (Gadamer, 1998, p. 68) 
The totality of life includes the mess of intuitions that are conditioned by our intentional relationship with objects 
that mean something, as is the case with objects that we experience as art. 
29 A clear glass of water, sitting on a clear glass shelf, anchored to the wall above a text panel. 
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formalists, as art became seen as a source of individual experience. As we have seen, the 
approach adopted by Modernist formalism relied on two central assumptions about art: first, that 
art was autonomous and, second, that the value of art was fundamentally aesthetic (Carroll, 2010, 
p. 145-163). Modernist formalism developed out of philosophical theories of form that began 
with Plato and Aristotle. In an attempt to provide theoretical coherence between art objects and 
the critics’ literary work, art critics harnessed philosophical notions of form, from Aristotle and 
Plato to the formalism of Kant’s aesthetics. Kantian disinterest was used to construct a theory of 
art that considered little beyond the compositional form of art objects within a specific material 
and theoretical frame. For art to fulfil its purpose, knowledge was not required of the artist’s 
intentions, nor was there any reason to privilege a work’s explicit reference to things or events in 
the world external to that aesthetic experience. The art object’s only aesthetically relevant 
properties were its formal properties. Philosophical notions of form justified formalism’s 
assumptions and provided a theoretical framework for a normative theory of art production, 
which contributed to a shift in our view of art.  
That theory and criticism could affect our understanding of art’s ontological status, 
among other things, had been brought to light, most obviously, by conversations that followed 
the introduction of Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain to The Society of Independent Artists.30 
Modernist formalism, in the hands of Clement Greenberg, demonstrated that a theory could 
change not only the way we make art, but also the way we see art. The tenets of formalist theory 
became embedded in the art critical landscape31 and provided a map of the visual terrain that 
consisted of, at the height of formalism’s art critical reign, abstract expressionist painting. 
Formalism and its proponents were, however, ill equipped by their own theoretical commitments 
to the purity of visual perception to see the impact of theory on visual culture and, subsequently, 
on the viewing subject’s experience of art.  
Artists who came after Greenberg considered neither themselves nor their art practice 
beholden to his theoretical commitments and so took up the less rigid implications of Modernist 
formalism, such as the impact of theory and an idea on the experience of art by a viewing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/3671180/Duchamps-Fountain-The-practical-joke-that-launched-an-artistic-
revolution.html 
31 I am pointing to the impact had on the institution of art, through the introduction and critical validation of artists 
like Jackson Pollock, as well as the art that appears to have been made possible, through the articulation of a theory 
of art by Greenberg that could be applied as a productive manifesto, as well as the impact of introducing philosophy 
rather than religion as a source of artistic inspiration. 
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subject. This idea, unintentionally demonstrated by formalism, became a method that emerging 
Conceptual artists employed in their use of theory as both content and material in the making of 
art.32 Art Historian John Bowles notes that, “While formalist artists and critics feigned ignorance 
of such supposedly extra-aesthetic information, Conceptual artists, in their artwork, 
acknowledged their interest in them. …” (Bowles, 2011, p. 35-36). The challenges posed by 
Conceptual art put pressure on the art critical interpretation of form as the only source of an art 
object’s value, to which all other features of art could be reduced. This pressure collapsed 
formalism as a viable theoretical guide to making art and made room for the Conceptual art 
movement. 
1.3 Form in Philosophy  
The development of formalist theory in art criticism leaned heavily on the philosophical 
understanding of the concept of form, following the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. The 
sections that follow trace the philosophical roots of formalism in modernist art criticism.  
1.3.1 Form in Plato and Aristotle 
The common usage of the term “form” varies in ways similar to its more nuanced 
applications. Form is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as a “Shape, arrangement of 
parts (n),”33 and “To give form or shape to; to put into or reduce to shape; to fashion, mould” 
(v).34 In common usage, as well as in philosophy and art criticism, form is both a perceptual 
thing and an idea. In both visual art and the physical world around us, form makes possible one 
object’s differentiation from another. The philosophical understanding of form can be 
schematized into two streams; one of which can be attributed to Plato, the other to Aristotle. In 
each, form can be either the visible shape of an object or it can refer to what makes the 
appearance of an object possible. In the platonic theory of Forms, objects in the world are 
imperfect copies of abstract and perfect forms. The Forms allow us to see that variations in the 
changing material world belong to a single and unchanging concept. Artists, in Plato’s Republic, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  “If the artist carries through his idea and makes it into visible form, then all the steps in the process are of 
importance. The idea itself, even if not made visual, is as much a work of art as any finished product. All intervening 
steps –scribbles, sketches, drawings, failed works, models, studies, thoughts, conversations– are of interest.  Those 
that show the thought process of the artist are sometimes more interesting than the final product.” (Sol Le Witt, 
Paragraphs) http://www.tufts.edu/programs/mma/fah188/sol_lewitt/paragraphs%20on%20conceptual%20art.htm 
33 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/73421 
34 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/73422 
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Book 10, are unable to access the true forms, and therefore unable to have access to knowledge 
and truth. They are able only to create copies of imperfect copies: “To make such an image 
requires no genuine knowledge: no knowledge of the real things of which one makes an image” 
(Gaut & Lopes, 2005, p. 5).  
Modernist formalism, although also a theory concerned with form, was in part 
underpinned by the assumption that art objects are autonomous of contextual concerns. The 
assumption that art is autonomous in this way frees it from performing a social or political 
function such as the communication of civic virtue in historical events. If art is autonomous, it is 
not mimetic because a painting or sculpture need not be about anything other than paint or 
sculptural material. Each instance of art, by this account, is not a copy of some form, it is a 
particular and individual instantiation of formal properties that are to be experienced as aesthetic. 
Bracketing the concerns of representational or communicative purpose means a viewer is not 
distracted by some imperfect copy but would connect with the pure form of the work itself. 
However, in the context of Modernist formalism, beauty is not something that can exist in 
separation from a work if beauty has anything to do with the aesthetic experience, which is the 
end result of a work that demonstrates formal properties.  
For Aristotle, form cannot be so neatly separated from material things in the world. 
Aristotelian form is not an archetypal and conceptual entity, as it is in Plato’s theory of Forms. 
Modernist formalism involves structures which can be compared to the emphasis Aristotle places 
on the importance of plot over character in the Poetics. (Gaut & Lopes, 2005, p. 21) When 
viewing visual art from a perspective informed by Modernist formalism, this means that 
representational content is unimportant and perhaps even unnecessary, as is the case in abstract 
expressionist paintings. The aesthetic properties are found only in the work itself, which is to say 
the work’s internal composition and, as Bell claimed, its “significant form.” The form of an art 
object in this perspective is the plot and is regulative of the work as a whole so that it need not 
refer to anything outside of itself. If the formal properties of an art object are the only properties 
that hold aesthetic value, what can be said of works art that have both formal properties and 
representational content? The Modernist formalist who is skeptical of the use of content might 
appeal to something like Plato’s argument that art is misleading because it is mimetic, although 
the formalist would say that art lacks value not because it is mimetic but if it attempts to replicate 
something in the world, such as Clive Bell’s statement, according to which “A rose is not 
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beautiful because it is like something else. Neither is a work of art” (Bell, 1929, p. 40). For Plato, 
mimesis fails to capture the truth of the abstract form and remains an imperfect copy of a copy. 
Aristotle is more generous and allows mimesis a place in the process of acquiring knowledge. As 
in the Poetics and its discussion of dramatic tragedy, what is imitated is not an abstract truth or 
Platonic Form, but a tangible experience that can be communicated through its generalization, as 
something that is universal and accessible to all, by virtue of its form. Of central importance to 
the success of this means of communication is the faculty of imagination, which allows an 
audience access to an experience that is not directly lived, but is presented as a possibility that is 
entered as though it were lived.  
 Many artists and art critics remain committed, if not explicitly, to models which could be 
traced back to Plato and Aristotle. One such model, which influenced Clive Bell’s formalism, is 
a romantic notion of form that, as Freydberg claims, “reflects the experience of striving to know 
that which is fixed and immutable” (Freydberg, 2000, p. 15). As a theory of art, Modernist 
formalism is informed by philosophical understandings of form as fixed and immutable. It is also 
informed by the formal as regulative and grounded in a universal sense of pleasure in the 
beautiful, which was adapted from Kantian aesthetics by Clement Greenberg. 
1.3.2 Immanuel Kant and Form  
Clement Greenberg developed his influential theory of Modernist formalism on the basis of his 
interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s aesthetics. Greenberg was certainly not the first to draw 
heavily on Kant to support his art critical theory. Kant’s work on aesthetics influenced art critics 
beginning as early as Madame de Stael’s 1813 interpretation of the Critique of Judgment in her 
book De Àllemagne (Prettejohn, 2005, p. 68-72). The introduction of Kantian aesthetics through 
early art critical interpretations such as De Àllemagne influenced the way art was seen, valued 
and made. In contrast to critics like Winckelmann, who provided highly subjective accounts of 
the beautiful that were grounded in stylistic conventions, appeals to emotion through the 
representation of historical events, or erotically depicted human bodies, Kant did not seek a set 
of rules that would validate specific judgments of beauty between works of art. Kant’s notions of 
free and dependent beauty, his notion of disinterest, and his suggestion that no human form 
represented in art could ever be viewed disinterestedly (Prettejohn, 2005, p. 68-72), contributed 
immensely to a view of art that emphasized depoliticization, dissociation from representational 
content and, at the core, autonomy from non-aesthetic concerns.  
	   26	  
Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment35 shifted the art critical gaze from a measure of 
art’s successful communication of normative social values, to a critique of the internal 
relationships between elements of composition and the depoliticized relationship of spectator to 
art object. Kant wanted to show that our aesthetic judgment and pleasure in response to beauty 
are not culturally determined. If our aesthetic judgments can be made in a way that is 
subjectively universal, yet not determined by our understanding, then the aesthetic value of art 
can be judged without referring to its representational content, or the extent to which it pleases 
the spectator on the grounds of her desires and interests. It is this premise that allows art’s 
autonomy in Modernist formalism.  
 Our judgment of the aesthetic differs from an interpretation of visual art because we 
require a general concept to make sense of art, which is not required by us to arrive at an 
aesthetic judgment. There can be no universal interpretation of a work because there need not be. 
Our interpretation of visual art relies on knowledge we have acquired about properties that are 
not aesthetic. The aesthetic judgment can be arrived at not only in response to an object of art but 
also in response to the beautiful in nature. There must be something universal in our experience 
of the aesthetic that is not dependent on knowledge we may have about the object of our 
aesthetic experience. For Kant, the potential for universal experience had to follow from forms of 
cognition that allow us to arrive at a synthesis of understanding and the sensible, through the 
forms of cognition that we bring to our experience of the world around us. Without these forms 
of cognition, we would lack the ability to synthesize the sensible with our understanding, leaving 
us adrift in an ocean of particulars for which we possess no means of subsuming under a general 
category. 
 The autonomy of art is tied to a condition of universality that cannot be met by non-
aesthetic properties, since these are determined by concepts, which require a cultural and 
linguistic frame. The aesthetic, although we may articulate our experience of it in terms that are 
rooted in culture, must be universal in the sense that humanity as a whole must have access to its 
experience, regardless of the frame in which they stand. As stated in my introduction, the art 
object is experienced as an object of consciousness and as structured by consciousness. Bernard 
Freydberg, in Provocative Form in Plato, Kant, Nietzsche (and Others), discusses what he calls 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: CoPJ. Ed. Guyer, Paul. Tr. Guyer, Paul and Eric 
Matthews. 2000. 
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“a re-enactment of the twofold presence of form” which is, in Freydberg’s words, “(1) as 
inhabiting a purely intelligible region and (2) as perched provocatively at the cusp of the visible” 
(Freydberg, 2000, p. 69).  The first fold of Kantian form exists independently of an object’s 
being. Its independence is not, however, the same as the way in which the form of an oak tree 
inheres in an acorn. Kantian form is not inherent in the object; it is inherent in the a priori 
capacity of our minds to identify an idea with objects in the world. The second fold of Kantian 
form identified by Freydberg is Platonic, as the form that sits on the cusp of the visible is the 
form that does manifest itself as an object. It is this fold of Kantian form that appealed most to 
Modernist formalists. The constructive role played by the formal elements of cognition in 
Kantian formalism became played instead by the formal elements of an art object’s composition 
in Modernist formalism. The art object remains reliant on a synthesis of understanding and 
intuition, but only insofar as the experience of the object requires the form on the cusp of the 
visible to provide the a priori readiness for judgment as well as the object that is intuited. 
Rodolpho Gasché claims form in art criticism is understood “as a surface phenomenon of things 
– their shape and the arrangement of their parts into a whole – the aestheticist approach fails to 
see that in the transcendental perspective of Kant’s investigation, form is tied to the formation of 
a representation of objects of nature that are cognitively unaccounted for” (Gasché, 2003, p. 6). 
Kantian form, notes Gasché, “concerns the how of an object’s appearing. It is what remains if an 
object is stripped of all its determinations – that is, determinations of what it is” (Gasché, 2003, 
p. 68). For an object to be stripped of its determinations, it must be judged reflectively, rather 
than as a particular instance of a universal concept. Form concerns the how of an object’s 
appearing because form allows the reflective judgment to be about something; a thing that exists 
in the world and can be sensed, yet need not be objectively purposive.  
 If pictorial representation in art is not its defining characteristic, critical attention shifts 
away from an art object’s representational success. Success in pictorial representation is 
determined by the extent to which an art object resembles life, which is a standard of success that 
is not consistent with the Modernist formalist assumption of art’s autonomy. Art that represents 
objects or events in life belong to stylistic conventions and socially normative expectations of 
what it is to experience art that are neither autonomous nor fundamentally aesthetic. The 
importance of Kantian aesthetics to contemporary art, Gasché argues, lies in Kant’s interest in 
beauty and in providing an account of aesthetic judgment, rather than in his account of artistic 
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judgment. He asks, “whether it is not precisely because Kant’s aesthetics is an aesthetics of 
natural beauty, rather than of artwork, that it is important for the understanding of the fine arts, 
and particularly of modern and postmodern art, which are the exclusive concern of post-Kantian 
aesthetics” (Gasché, 2003, p. 3). Postmodern art tends to be amorphous and difficult to sort into 
neat categories, since, motivated in part by an emphasis on originality, it often aims precisely to 
breach the material and institutional. This emphasis on originality can be traced to Kant’s use of 
“genius” as a means of connecting our experience of nature’s beauty to that of art. The artistic 
genius could produce for others the raw beauty that we experience when confronted by the forms 
of nature, Kant said, which “gives the rule to art” CoPJ, §46 (Tr. Guyer & Matthews, 2000, p. 
186). Yet Kant’s artistic genius is not able to put into words the rule that led to an art object’s 
making. Conceptual artist Joseph Kosuth thought that art would inherit the ground once occupied 
by philosophy for reasons that I think are related to Kant’s account of genius. According to 
Kosuth art could transcend the limits of philosophy because, after the decline of representation 
and the abandonment of modernism’s obsession with physical form, ideas would be the only 
material left to artists, and concepts could only be explored if they became indeterminate by 
becoming art, since becoming art would widen the possibility for multiple interpretations. 
Kosuth’s own approach to making art was more literal than this, but other artists created 
transformative experiences that were open to multiple interpretations not only using art objects, 
but objects in the everyday world around us, through performative acts, such as those performed 
by Joseph Beuys and Adrian Piper.36 
 From my perspective, form in Modernist formalism is phenomenal; it is the object we 
perceive as either literally an art object’s shape or the composition within the frame of a work. 
However, several of the theoretical implications of formalism appear to rely on an understanding 
of form that is intelligible, even conceptual, rather than phenomenal. The tension between the 
apparent and the implicit understandings of form might be attributable to Kant’s own writing on 
form, which influenced the work of both Bell and Greenberg. I will attempt to provide a concise, 
and hopefully accurate portrait of form in Kant’s aesthetics, making reference to Kant’s Third 
Critique and the work of Gasché, Freydberg, and Uehling, to make these art critical tensions 
explicit, which will support and put into context my own understanding of the concept of form in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 For instance, I like America and America likes me, 1974 by Joseph Beuys and Adrian Piper’s Catalysis Series in 
1970. Both performances were interactive with a living audience, a coyote in Beuys’ case and people on the street 
who did not understand or know of Piper’s intent.  
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art criticism. For Kant, form allows an object to be given as an object of perception through the 
formal structures that are space and time (Gasché, 2003, p. 68). Formal structures are aspects of 
the objects we perceive by way of the intuition, which allows phenomenal attributes of an object 
to be apprehended as spatially and temporally determined. Gasché reasons that, “Because form 
in the aesthetic reflective sense relates to empirically given things, it is not the one form of 
phenomenality in general, but always necessarily manifold” (Gasché, 2003, p. 71). The manifold 
form is not only that of the object itself, but also that which allows the viewer to experience 
objects of perception as about something, since the intuition provides formal structures that allow 
the possibility of a unified yet manifold form rather than a flood of particulars. The relationship, 
then, between the formal structures of consciousness and the form of the object of perception is 
such that, in Gasché’s words “the empirical manifold gives rise to reflective judgments if this 
manifold of ““the aggregate of particular experiences” presents itself in such a manner as to 
reveal some order” so that, continues Gasché, “reflection can proceed on the heuristic 
assumption that it is a lawful whole, that is, that the aggregate has the “form” of a system” 
(Gasché, 2003, p. 76). The form that presents itself in Kant’s account is, from my perspective, 
the phenomenal form that is composed by an “aggregate of particular experiences.”  
 Just as Kant distinguished beauty in nature from beauty in art, Gasché draws a similar 
distinction between objects that are art and objects that are the result of art (Gasché, 2003, p. 78). 
The first can be objects of the aesthetic reflective judgment, “in the absence of determinate 
concepts of the understanding” (Gasché, 2003, p. 78). The second cannot be objects of the 
aesthetic judgment because an object that is the result of a determinate concept, art, cannot be 
apprehended in the absence of its concept (Gasché, 2003, p. 78). There is a problem here, not 
least of which is the implication that only objects not created by man can be objects of a 
reflective, aesthetic judgment, and therefore art, which seems counterintuitive. If the problem of 
connecting the beauty of art to that of nature can be solved by something other than Kant’s 
artistic genius, while retaining the formalism distinct to Kantian aesthetics, it cannot be made, as 
Gasché seems to propose, by moving the distinction between forms of nature and forms of art 
into one between forms of art itself. What, then, are we to say about ready-mades, or more 
indeterminate, postmodern forms of art, in which the concept behind an object’s creation exists 
(close to) independently of its object? Are the objects art while the ideas, and the statements 
meant to accompany them, stand as the art object? Or is, as Kosuth suggested would become the 
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case, the concept, in its own formless indeterminacy, the art, while the work that results from that 
idea the art object. A further problem is our inability to explain the search for meaning in art. 
Part of the search is reliant on artistic intention, but that does not go far enough. If discerning the 
authorial intentions was the goal of the search for meaning in art, interpretation would stop at the 
statement, and curatorial interpretations would consist of a reiteration of the artist’s statement. 
The problem of interpretation is that the search for meaning implies it must be sought in the 
heuristic assumption of a system that leads to Gasché’s version of Kantian form, rather than 
meaning in the form of a determinate and unifying concept.  
Form cannot be neatly reduced to either a set of shapes that objects take, or a set of 
conditions in the observing subject. Form is manifold and complex, involving both the objects 
and their viewing subject. To commit entirely to only one portion of the manifold as definitive of 
form would be to make the same error made by modernist art critics, in their attempt to identify 
modern art directly with a reductive and ultimately unsuccessful formalist theory of art. Gasché 
notes that “‘Mere form’, ... is the pre-objective and pre-predicative condition under which 
empirical manifolds of intuition can be gathered into figures of objectivity, in the absence of 
determined concepts” (Gasché, 2003, p. 87). The conditions in which “mere form” exists belong 
to our cognitive faculties that allow us to intuit objects as existing in time and space. The figure 
of objectivity is the phenomenal form of an object, the intuition of which is made possible by 
“mere form” as a condition. The unity of the phenomenal form and the formal condition that 
allows synthesis in the absence of a determined concept makes the reflective judgment possible, 
and thereby enables the aesthetic experience.  
 It seems odd that one could claim the absence of a determined concept in the face of 
phenomenal form, since we can say that we possess the concept of shape, line, etc. In the case of 
modernist painting, are we experiencing the concept of shape and line within the concept of a 
frame, under the concept painting, rather than the form of an object in a manifold sense?  One 
response to this question can be provided by Freydberg, who would claim: “There is no form of 
“man” nor of “beauty,” but merely the form of any possible object of experience. … Rather, the 
Kantian object can be said to let itself be determined by the way it shows itself” (Freydberg, 
2000, p. 75). The way that an object is determined by the way that it shows itself, rather than as 
what it is known to be, limits the possibilities of our intuition by the phenomenal form of the 
object itself, yet also limits the possibilities of our apprehension of the object by the form of our 
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own intuition of the object as both subjectively available to experience and as an object that is 
limited by spatial and temporal constraints. For the experience of form in art to be an experience 
of beauty, the judgment made must have been a reflective judgment. Freydberg argues that the 
reflective judgment involves the subjective relation of the “apprehender to what is apprehended 
with regard to the subject’s feeling” (Freydberg, 2000, p. 80). Further to this, “form seems to be 
a mere abstraction from the concept of purpose, which is located neither in the realm of nature 
(visible) nor the realm of freedom (intelligible)” (Freydberg, 2000, p. 80). I argue that form, even 
if it is considered an abstraction of the concept of purpose, exists in both the visible and 
intelligible realms. Form as exhibited by a synthesized manifold belongs to the object as it has 
been directly apprehended, in conjunction with the subject’s reflective judgment of that object.  
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Chapter Two – Form, Engaged Consciousness and context 
2.1 Consciousness as Engaged – Arnold Berleant 
Arnold Berleant’s claims an aesthetic experience “is more a perspective or phase of experience 
than a kind of experience” (Berleant, 1970, p. 94). A kind of experience would require a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions that set it apart from other kinds of experience, while 
understanding the aesthetic as a phase allows differing attributes of experience to overlap. When 
Berleant refers to art, he is not referring to specific objects of art, he is addressing the 
phenomenon of making and experiencing art as continuous with the whole of human life, as an 
activity that is both constructive and representative of our cumulative social and historical 
experience. Therefore, although his object of analysis is art as a human endeavour rather than a 
naturally and spontaneously occurring object, he is denying that our experience of art refers to 
anything but itself. So, to claim that art IS experience, he must allow art to exist as a concept that 
can be dissociated from the world of objects. Art that is not an object but merely a concept is, 
from my perspective what is referred to when we speak of art as a practice. In our experience of 
art objects, the facticity of a specific art object’s form is undeniable, since we are conscious of 
art objects as objects that are given, rather than ideas that we construct. Addressing art as a 
concept appears to conflict with Berleant’s claim that engagement as a state of consciousness is 
neither definite nor completely conceptual.  
Berleant presents a view of consciousness as engaged and aesthetics as embedded in 
experience, rather than constituting an experience. For Berleant, a conversation about aesthetic 
phenomena must not focus on a specific style of art lest we be limited prior to beginning by the 
theoretical constraints embedded therein, e.g. abstract expressionist painting as exemplar of 
Modernist formalism. If we limit a conversation about art to certain styles, then we are 
approaching the experience of art as something that is determined by the object. We must, rather, 
as Berleant claims, “determine the objects of art by the experience of art” (Berleant, 1970, p. 7). 
What Berleant means by this is that we beg the question “of what is indeed artistic” (Berleant, 
1970, p. 7) if we decide what objects can be experienced as art based on the specific properties 
that an art object must have. I agree with Berleant’s claim that the experience of art determines 
the object, so long as the conditions that allow us to experience art at all are included in an 
account of what it is for experience to determine the art object. Styles of art, if they are 
considered to present the properties of an object that are necessary for an experience of the object 
	   33	  
as art are certainly problematic. I limit my conversation in this chapter to two styles of art and 
the theoretical claims which support these styles, but I do not present them as determining our 
experience of art. I think that Modernist formalism and Conceptual art, in both their stark 
contrast and odd similarity, inform an account of what role form plays in our experience of an 
object as art. 
As we have seen in the first chapter, Modernist formalism as a theory of art went both too 
far and not far enough, in what it was able to show about art. It went too far in attempting to 
show that art could be defined and judged by materially specific formal properties in the object 
and it did not go far enough by failing to situate these formal properties socially and historically. 
Berleant claims, “There are connections with experience beyond the perception of form alone 
that may be aesthetically relevant. The art object does not exist in a world by itself” (Berleant, 
1970, p. 37). By limiting the aesthetically relevant properties of an art object, formalism is a 
variety of what Berleant calls a surrogate theory that “replaces the full scope of the social 
origins, experience, and the relevance of art with a sacrosanct object, protected by the hallowed 
walls of the museum and nurtured in the sensitive soul of the esthete” (Berleant, 1970, p. 38). 
Like Berleant, I believe that there may be, in his words, “an intimate connection that art has, not 
necessarily with the appearances of things, but rather with our experiences of them” (Berleant, 
1970, p. 39). I do, however, maintain that our experience of art remains connected to its 
appearance. This is not to say that the experience of art requires merely that we are able to 
perceive, which is the case if we view art through a simplified Modernist formalist lens. The core 
assumptions of Modernist formalism, that art is autonomous and fundamentally aesthetic, mean 
that the experience of art through the lens of Modernist formalism cannot include the “full scope 
of the social origins” of any art object. As a surrogate theory in Berleant’s sense, Modernist 
formalism considers the formal properties of an art object “sacrosanct,” as the only properties 
that are essential to our experience of art. The viewer’s experience of art, if Berleant is right 
about an object of art being determined as such by our experience of it, cannot be connected to 
the object of art in a way that is passive. Determining the experience of art as such by its 
appearance means that the viewer is passively receiving what is given.  
In Conceptual art, the viewer plays an active role in constructing her experience of art. 
From my perspective, allowing or in some cases demanding that the viewer become actively 
involved in constructing her experience of art represents a challenge to Modernists formalist 
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assumptions that art is autonomous and fundamentally aesthetic. My position is that the 
experience of art is actively constructed by the subject in conjunction with what is given as the 
appearance of an art object. So, to say that art is connected to our experience of things is not to 
say that it is disconnected from the appearance of things. The appearance of things we call art 
plays a role in determining why we experience a thing as art rather than as any other thing. This 
is not, however, the role given to form by Modernist formalists, which is that the form, as a 
property of the appearance of an art object, determines the experience of that object to be an 
experience of art. Conceptual art presents a case in which it is not the properties, formal or 
otherwise, of an object that determine our experience of it as art, although we may associate 
certain properties of objects with what we would expect or choose to call art. By rejecting 
Modernist formalist assumptions about art and assuming, instead, that art is fully connected to its 
social origins, Conceptual art changed what we understand to be properties that denote an art 
object; that determine how and in response to what we experience art. From the perspective of an 
artist, the implication of granting art a sort of freedom from the constraint of material and formal 
properties is that, now, any object can be experience as art so long as someone is willing to 
make, and hopefully justify, that claim.37  
The freedom from material constraint introduced a problem: if any object can be 
experienced as art, there can be no determination of an object of art that is not in some way 
arbitrary. In my practice as an artist, formalism provided a means of determining what made 
sense, both in terms of what role an idea could reasonably play in the experience of art and what, 
if any, properties of an art object would indeed determine the experience of something I made to 
be an experience of art. The decisions I made about how and what to make formed the 
foundation not only of art objects, but a way of making art objects, referred to as an “art 
practice.”  An art practice consists of, primarily, a set of commitments about the nature and 
experience of art that guide its making. The view of art as a practice that requires ideas and 
justifications is, from my perspective, heavily influenced by the way early Conceptual artists 
made their work. Art as a practice has no appearance and can exist independently of the art 
objects made following the logic of a given practice.  
37 Such as Art and Languages Air Conditioning Show, or Kelly Mark’s performance pieces that involve working - 
http://kellymark.com/StaffSecurity1.html 
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It is difficult, but certainly not impossible, to find a role for form in the experience of art 
as a practice if the form is given by the practice’s conceptual content. Noël Carroll defends 
content-based formalism,38 which I think offers a philosophical response, analogous to my own 
art practice, to the challenge of Conceptual art’s indeterminacy by claiming that we can have 
equivalently aesthetic experiences of Conceptual art by hearing it described to us as by seeing it 
ourselves (Carroll, 2010, p. 87). Carroll claims we experience the aesthetic in objects, and that 
our experience is determined by the form of the content, which includes the choices made by the 
artist in creating that content (the artist’s practice). For this to be the case, an experience that is 
aesthetic must be distinguished from one that is not on the basis of its form. So, while Carroll’s 
content-formalism can accommodate the difficulty presented by Conceptual art as anti-formal 
because of its material indeterminacy, Carroll is still allowing our experience to be determined 
by the object. While Berleant claims our experience of art is distinct from other “phases” of 
experience,39 he does not think that this unique experience is necessarily aesthetic since he 
identifies the aesthetic experience with the experience of art,40 which leads him to reverse on 
Kant’s attachment of beauty to nature: only art can be experienced in this unique way. Berleant’s 
reversal means the difference between our experience of art and that of other objects is, if we 
experience a phenomenon as aesthetic, then we think of that phenomenon as an art object, so that 
the experience determines the nature of the object, rather than the form of the object determining 
our experience of it41 (Berleant, 1970, p. 7). I see Berleant pushing too hard in the opposite 
direction from Kant, yet arriving at a very similar point, by replacing disinterest with 
engagement, and grounding the aesthetic experience in art rather than nature. He is not claiming 
that we cannot experience nature aesthetically rather he claims, if we experience nature 
aesthetically, we experience nature as art.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 “The form of an artwork is the ensemble of choices intended to realize the point or purpose of an artwork” 
(Carroll, 2010, p. 87).  
39 “while aesthetic experience has an identity, it is not set off from other modes of experience by some unique 
attribute. (It is an) ... experience qualified by the presence of characteristics which make it aesthetic. … It is more a 
perspective or phase of experience than a kind of experience.” (Berleant, 1970, p. 93-94) 
40 I am reaching somewhat here, since I am not including any of Berleant’s work on environmental aesthetics. He 
sees the aesthetic as deeply embedded in the experience of being human, so that the environment is constructed 
through our being part of it. This remains a reversal of Kantian aesthetics, since it means that the genius of man as a 
conscious being renders nature artistic. 
41 “We must, however, determine the objects of art by the experience of art, not the experience by the objects. For 
the latter begs the question of what is indeed artistic.” (Berleant, 1970, p. 7) This is directly connected to the issue I 
want to raise about intentionality and the placement of context in form through experience of the aesthetic as an 
object of consciousness. 
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2.2 Making art 
Rules of art making in the past included constraints on production in accordance with 
conventions of media, style and content.42 It remains common for artists to work within a set of 
rules that determine visual aspects of art making such as composition, use of colour and 
presentation, regardless of the media in which they tend to work. In my own visual art training, 
instructors referred to both contextual and objective elements of design, which encouraged 
students to develop a set of rules, called an art practice, that guide the material production and 
conceptual content of their work. Training in visual art also involved regular critiques of each 
student’s work. Studio critiques43 affirmed both a common sense of taste regarding design and a 
set of norms used to judge the degree of alignment between an artist’s intent and the object 
created in the spirit of that intent. Discussions about how well aligned an art object is with the 
artist’s intent are underpinned by assumptions about our experience of art that are 
philosophically interesting. The tension between Modernist formalism and Conceptual art is 
located in the experience of art. Each movement adopted a set of opposing assumptions about art 
and our experience of it: in Modernist formalism, the experience of art is aesthetic in a more or 
less Kantian sense, and in Conceptual art it is conceptual rather than aesthetic. As an art student, 
my experience of art and art making was deeply influenced by both Modernism and Conceptual 
art44 as reaction against formalism. 45  
As a philosophy student, I was troubled by the assumptions made by other students and 
by my professors during studio art critiques: some of these assumptions concerned our ability to 
perceive ideas or, rather, the objective conditions that must obtain for us to perceive an idea, 
while others were about the commonality of our experience of art. As an art student, I found it 
difficult to make art that satisfied the largely conceptual requirements of studio art assignments. 
Making art for a studio class taught by a professor whose own art practice can be described as 
42 I am generalizing broadly, with the knowledge that contemporary artists might say the same about art making 
today. Technical training in the use of art media has, anecdotally, been left behind at most art schools (not all) in 
favour of an approach that I think is highly influenced by Conceptual art. 
43 A studio critique is an essential part of assessment in most art classes at the college and university level. Students 
present their assigned artwork to the class. The efficacy of each work is discussed by the instructor and all students, 
and defended by the artist.  
44 Art historical convention denotes ‘Conceptual art’ as a movement, most active and easily distinguished from other 
ways of making and talking about art during the late 1960s and 1970s (Wood, 2002, p. 2) 
45 Osborne argues that “philosophy was the means for [Conceptual art’s] usurpation of critical power [from 
Modernism] by a new generation of artistic intentionality in a radically new, critically discursive guise” (Newman 
and Bird, p. 49) 
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conceptual means making art that must effectively represent the idea or set of ideas presented as 
the problem of a given assignment. When making art that represents an idea, I begin by assuming 
that the idea informs all stages of the art object’s material production.46 This is to say that the 
representation must be total, so that if the materials were changed, so too would the meaning of 
the finished piece change. In studio art critiques, students discuss ways to bring composition, and 
the choice of colour or material of an art object into closer alignment with the idea intended by 
the artist. I found these discussions interesting, but I also found the connection between the 
appearance of the object and the idea represented to be one that required discussion rather than 
perception. The starting point of the experience of art as an idea did not ever seem to truly be the 
art object itself, if an idea had been defined in advance of perceiving the object. Roman Ingarden 
said of the aesthetic experience that: “It is, namely, true that in cases similar to those described 
(the Venus of Milo) we begin with the perception of a real object. But the question is, first, 
whether, when starting from a real object, we remain within its limits while an aesthetic 
perception is taking place in ourselves, and, secondly, whether the starting from a real object is 
indispensable in every case of aesthetic perception” (Ingarden 1961, p. 290). Ingarden claims, if 
it is the case that we can have an aesthetic experience in response to an object that is not real, 
then we need not start from a real object.  This is to say that the starting point of an aesthetic 
experience does not need to remain within the (perceptual) limits of a real object since those 
limits are no longer set by the percept but rather by the concept. That our experience can begin 
with an object that is not real, however, entails neither that we must start from an object that is 
not real, nor that we cannot start from a real object. From my perspective, Conceptual art as a 
reaction to formalism begins with the idea that art is not a real object. In seeking a starting point 
beyond the experience of an art object itself, the role played by consciousness and the objects of 
which we are conscious can only be considered through a limited and reductive lens.  
The experience of making art is distinct from the experience of viewing art as an activity, 
but I do not experience a separation between the making and viewing of art at a more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 I take this assumption to be the strongest remaining characteristic of Conceptual art’s approach, which made it 
distinct as a movement and which continues to play a role in contemporary artist’s practices. Peter Osborne’s essay 
Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy identifies this characteristic, which distinguished Conceptual art from other art 
practices in its early days, as the “immanent logic of an object-producing, though not object-based, practice which 
evolved, primarily, through the exploration of the effects of self-regulating series and systems of rules for decision-
making …” Osborne attributes the first articulation of Conceptual art in this way to Sol LeWitt’s “Paragraphs on 
Conceptual Art,” published in Artforum in 1967. (Newman and Bird, p. 52) 
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fundamental level of what it is like to experience what we call the aesthetic. An art object, once it 
is no longer being made, becomes free from the ideas and intent of the artist, so that it gains a 
sort of autonomy as an object. The interpretation of an art object on the basis of an artist’s intent 
is not justifiable if the apprehension of an art objects is autonomous from context and artistic 
intent. In the case of contemporary, Conceptual art, the artist’s statements that accompany most 
exhibits undermine the autonomy of an art object because they make explicit the relationship 
between the object’s appearance to a viewer and the act of its making by an artist. An art object, 
interpreted through the lens of a theoretically dense artist’s statement, may become the physical 
embodiment of a specific theory, rather than an autonomous object that is capable of holding 
multiple interpretations. The form of the art object becomes, as Carroll claimed, the cumulative 
set of decisions made by the artist, to which I would add the viewer’s experience. Through 
Carroll’s content-based formalism, Conceptual art can then be experienced as an idea as well as 
an object, the form of which need not be perceived for it is to be experienced as art. Although 
this appears almost self-evident in Conceptual art, particularly in the case of pieces like Walter 
de Maria’s 1977 Vertical Earth Kilometer (a set of two inch thick brass rods, sunk one kilometre 
into the earth, leaving only the top of each visible, flush with the surface of the earth), there is a 
problem in locating the form of art in purely conceptual terms of reference. The connection 
between the appearance of art and our experience of it is undone if art can be experienced 
exclusively as an idea. The experience of art is itself not connected merely to the idea of art, but 
also to the physical presence of an art object through which we are able to encounter the 
unchanging aspects of our own existence and the spatial and temporal limits within which we 
may exist as free. 
From a studio art perspective, the distinction between making and viewing art as an 
activity is stark, but I found that there remained some fundamental sense in which the experience 
of making art remained indistinct. The experience of being deeply engaged in an activity such as 
drawing is not unlike that of being deeply engrossed in the experience of viewing an art object. 
Although there are many ways to make art, I wish to focus on the technique of drawing from life. 
Drawing from life is a meditation on the sensory experience of an object as it is given, 
immediately and pre-conceptually. For example, to draw a tree, one must bracket the story that 
can be told about trees, particularly the stories that tell us how trees appear; they have branches, 
they are usually green and brown, and they tend to grow upward. The lines that one draws are 
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aligned with, but need not be representationally identical to, what the artist is seeing. The two-
dimensional rendering of a thing that can be identified as a tree, using this method, is not the aim 
of the exercise.  If I do not bracket concept of tree, it is the concept – or what I think a tree looks 
like, that I draw, rather than the particular object. The act of drawing as a meditation on direct 
perception can be described as an exercise in Kantian disinterest since the student practicing this 
activity is focused on nothing other than the physical form of the object. All other concerns are 
dismissed, including of what use the object may be, whether it is desirable or not, and what it 
should look like relative to other objects of its kind. I make the case, however, that even in this 
state of disinterested meditation on an object of consciousness, the artist, or a viewing subject, 
must also be engaged in the way Berleant described. That is, the method I am describing is 
taught in studio drawing classes as a means of allowing students to see an object as it is given, 
and then recall that perception accurately enough to reproduce it in two dimensions. The students 
are taught that their knowledge and understanding of an object bias their perception of it, so that 
the ability to accurately draw from life is impaired. If a student who is learning to draw from life 
meditates on the object as it is given to her senses, and she bracket her knowledge of what the 
object is and what interests of her own it might satisfy, then her consciousness of the object is 
abstracted. The drawing she then produces of that abstraction is not a representation of the object 
but of her experience of it.   
From my perspective, the two primary assumptions made by Modernist formalism are 
evident in the method as I just described it. First of all the assumption that perception can be pure 
and direct is obviously at work. But the assumption that art is autonomous is also at work. That 
is, when one approaches drawing as a meditation, on an object as it is given by direct perception, 
one works in accordance with assumptions made by Modernist formalists about our experience 
of art. I think that the assumptions made, that art is fundamentally aesthetic and autonomous, and 
that perception can be pure and direct are useful in exactly the way that they were used in studio 
art classes – as a meditation on perception and representation.  
However, the fundamental problems with Modernist formalism are also evident in the 
very method of drawing from life.  What seems at first to be an exercise in liberation from 
dogmatic ways of thinking about the visual can in turn become a dogma. Gadamer claims, then, 
that, “Pure seeing and pure hearing are dogmatic abstractions that artificially reduce phenomena” 
(Gadamer, 1998, p. 92). When drawing from life, the properties of an object of perception that 
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are relevant to the exercise are those that can be reduced to only the visual and, in most cases, 
only the lines that define shape and contour. If what is appropriate to a method is taken as the 
foundation of a theory of art, however, the constraints imposed on the artist fail to adequately do 
justice to wider practices in art and to the challenges that contemporary artists pose for 
themselves, such as Conceptual art which, as I have pointed out many times, is not 
fundamentally aesthetic or autonomous in the sense which is central in the drawing from life 
method.  
From my perspective, there remains a sense in which the experience itself of being 
engaged in the activity of drawing from life using the method I describe is liberating. This is the 
case only if the experience of being so engaged is viewed in light of Gadamer’s position that 
pure seeing is a dogmatic abstraction. The experience of drawing from life reveals not the pure 
form of an object of perception, but a possible form in the drawing itself that originates not only 
in perception, but also in the very experience of the act of drawing. In contrast to Gadamer’s 
position on pure perception, Freydberg claims “Pure understanding and pure intuition provide 
formal elements. But only by means of imagination can there be any forming. Even our 
awareness of form is dependent upon the work of imagination, through whose forming activity 
form becomes manifest to us at all” (Freydberg, 2000, p. 75). During the act of drawing from 
life, the form of the object that emerges on paper is, in a sense, the form that, through the 
imagination, becomes manifest to the one engaged in the act of drawing. The actual drawing 
itself does not represent the pure form of an object; rather, it is a form that manifests through an 
act that depends on the imagination. Freydberg also claims there is no form of a concept, but 
only “the form of any possible object of experience” (Freydberg, 2000, p. 75).47 The experience 
of an object as art is not of art as autonomous, if art is considered in this case the form of a 
possible object of experience and if form need not manifest by an act of pure perception. 
Freydberg’s position supports my view that the form of art is not to be located in the object 
simply speaking, as a pure form that is given but not itself formed by the viewer, without losing 
sight, as it were, of form in the art object as would be the case in Gadamer’s position. I aim, in 
the next section, to reveal that part of formalism that is not dogmatic and that plays a 
47 To be clear, Freydberg is, in these passages, putting forward how view of form in Kant’s CoPJ, although this is 
fundamental to Freydberg’s own position on the concept of form, which he refers to as "provocative form". 
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constructive role in the experience of art, particularly in that of making art, as I have described 
the act from my perspective as a studio artist.  
2.3 Ways of Seeing - Art 
When we turn our gaze toward a tree, we do so in several different ways, each of which is 
distinct yet dependent on the other. We must not only encounter, through the senses, an object of 
consciousness for apprehension, but we must form a consciousness of that object that can be 
synthesized. The absence of an intuition that can be the focus of our gaze leaves us with no 
consciousness of an object to experience. This is not to say that we cannot experience a 
recollection, or an imagined object, but that our ability to do so depends on our knowing that 
objects exist for us to be conscious of, and that we can, with the exception of unusual 
circumstances, tell the difference between what we sense, and what we imagine or remember. 
The understanding synthesizes our intuition, the manifold of intuition that we gain from our 
senses, with a concept. As we look at the tree, we intuit those features that not only can be 
synthesized into the knowledge that the object on which we are focussed is a tree, but we also 
intuit the specific details that, when synthesized by the understanding, signify this tree as a type 
of conifer, suffering from a minor case of oversaturation caused by recent heavy rainfall, or 
something like that. We can tell a story like this about the tree because we have the ability to 
match the appearance of an object with what we know about the concept to which that particular 
set of intuitions belong. Our ability to tell this story relies on the synthesis of intuition and 
understanding.  
The concepts we employ allow us to construct a story about what is given in the world 
around us, in a way that is coherent and communicable. Concepts, because they are 
universalizing, provide us with justifiable claims to knowledge that we rely on to communicate 
with others who possess similar concepts. The story that we tell must not only be internally 
coherent, but its intuitions and concepts and must be available to others. For us to say that we 
experienced the story is a very different claim than to say that we understood the story, or even 
that we know what the story meant.48 The same difference holds in the experience of the art. We 
can experience our consciousness of an art object with no knowledge of the concepts that were 
employed in its making. Knowing the material choices and the art historical context in which the 	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object is situated may, however, impact our experience. This possibility implies that 
consciousness and experience are distinct but related, and that their relationship is one of 
necessity. Consciousness is required for a subject’s experience of anything, whether the 
experience is of a thought, memory or hallucination, or a sensory intuition of an object in the 
world. If consciousness and experience are distinct, they must be so in a way that respects this 
relationship and the ways in which both are impacted by our apprehension of phenomena and 
how we construct a story from sensory intuitions. If we must be conscious of an object in order 
to have some experience of it, how direct is our experience of any phenomenon and what is 
added or removed from the consciousness of an object for us to have an experience? We can 
have good or bad experiences, but we cannot say the same about our consciousness of an object.  
The distance separating consciousness from experience is qualitative and the aesthetic 
experience sits closest to our sense of value as it relates to our consciousness of objects and, in 
the case that interests me most, objects that we perceive visually and experience as art. If the 
distance between the aesthetic experience and consciousness consists of value, which is 
subjectively determined, how can the form of an object provide the grounds for an experience 
that is common across multiple subjects? The consciousness of an object can be universal under 
obvious requisite conditions, but the conditions of a common experience, particularly in the case 
of art objects that embody meaning, are far less obvious. This difficulty is due primarily to the 
notion that a common experience of art is equivalent to a uniform judgment of taste or 
interpretation of meaning. Although the distance between our consciousness and our experience 
of an art object may consist of our forming a subjective sense, feeling or emotion, uniformity in 
the response is not required for the experience to have been of art. In the case of an art object, 
Berleant’s engaged subject is an active participant who exercises the freedom of her imagination, 
so that the proper concept is detached not because we are disinterested, but because we can 
bracket that knowledge, thereby applying it in a way that uses the free play of the imagination 
rather than applying the rule of the understanding. 
The aesthetic experience is cast by Berleant as the most authentic means of engaging the 
world around us (Berleant, 2010, p. 44). I see this as meaning that the aesthetic experience is the 
authentic engagement with, but not the pure perception of an object of consciousness. An 
experience is authentic, in Berleant’s account, if it is of an engaged, rather than a disinterested 
consciousness. By claiming that our consciousness of an object must be engaged, Berleant means 
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that our intuitions need not remain pre-conceptual for us to have an aesthetic experience. The 
knowledge we have of the world conditions our experience of it, although it neither structures 
nor categorizes the content of our experience, but rather expands that content. To accept the 
assumption of consciousness as engaged is to reject the Kantian idea of a disinterested distance 
between experience and consciousness that is barren and consists of only the manifold of 
intuition, unsynthesized and uncategorized.  
Disinterest in the aesthetic experience requires us to be directly aware of an object. I see 
the concept of disinterest as not only a lack of desire, but also a state in which consciousness 
must be freed from the concepts that would typically fulfill our practical need to make timely 
judgments about the objects of our consciousness. Direct awareness in Kantian terms is the pre-
reflective consciousness and, although it is plausible that an experience could also be direct, such 
an experience would remain the direct experience of our pre-reflective consciousness; experience 
remains always the experience of consciousness. Experience does not, even as disinterested and 
pre-reflective, precede consciousness, nor is it identical with consciousness. Disinterest is also 
the bracketing of our consciousness of an object from concerns of an object’s use or the role that 
an object plays in relation to others. From my perspective, we experience the aesthetic when we 
isolate our consciousness of an object to a moment in time in which the object is uniquely 
apprehended. In this sense, I think that both Kant and Berleant had it right: the aesthetic 
experience of pre-reflective consciousness is disinterested in that it need not be contained by 
concepts of the understanding for us to perceive the object, or experience our consciousness of 
that object, but it is also engaged in that, absent of the conceptual ordering of our experience, we 
are engaged with the experience in all its complexity as a whole, rather than as a delineable 
series of parts that must fit determinate concepts. We have, in the aesthetic experience, access to 
a complex and contextually dependent mix of beliefs, ideas and peripheral concerns but we are 
not constrained by it. The aesthetic experience is our connection between an object and our 
consciousness of that object, as temporally and spatially unique. But is not truly direct, in 
temporal nor spatial terms.  
2.4 Ways of Seeing - Meaning 
The art object can of course only be experienced as art by a conscious being. As stated in the 
preceding section, there can be no pure perception, and experience is always the experience of 
consciousness. The experience of Conceptual art is of an object that embodies meaning, which 
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requires concepts. The experience of Conceptual art, then, seems to require some knowledge that 
an object can be meaningful and that the primary source of that meaning is the object’s status as 
art. The experience of a bowl as meaningful is not necessarily an experience of the bowl as art. 
However, an experience of the bowl as art means that the meaning attached to the object shifts in 
accord with the viewing subject’s understanding of what it is like to experience an object as art. 
In what account of the experience of Conceptual Art, which is about meaning, concepts and 
knowledge rather than the object, can the form of an object of perception play a role? In Kant’s 
account, the forms of space and time allow us to organize the manifold of intuition into a 
spatially structured and temporally sequenced whole. The whole into which our intuitions are 
organized, the synthesis of apprehension, must result in a whole that is not greatly different from 
that which other conscious beings obtain through their own acts of synthesis. Kant’s discussion 
about the possibility of experience is directed at the person in a global sense, not the person as an 
individual. The universality of the whole is arrived at by a synthesis of the understanding and the 
intuition in this account because the act of synthesis, if globally rather than individually 
determined, guarantees the a priori universality of a whole that is structured in the same way and 
of the same intuitions from one individual to another. It is simply not possible to isolate a 
moment if it did not occur within a sequence, nor to locate a thing in space if there is no way to 
differentiate one point in space from any other point. The structures of time and space are the 
grounds of any possible experience and cannot be deduced from experience. I take this account 
to be true of experience in general and of our experience of art specifically. The challenges posed 
by Conceptual art weaken a dogmatic formalist account of our experience of art, but a viable 
account of the role played by form in our experience of art, even Conceptual art, can be built of 
Kant’s account of experience in general in conjunction with Berleant’s account of the engaged 
consciousness and Gadamer’s rejection of pure seeing and pure understanding. 
If this kind of universality that Kant identifies in his Critique of Pure Reason and exploits 
in the second and third Critiques, explains how it is that there is a certain universal basis for 
experience, it cannot be developed as a fully normative theory in art criticism.  As mentioned 
earlier, Gadamer claims pure seeing and pure understanding are dogmatic abstractions that 
artificially reduce phenomena. We may, however, still share an experience with others in terms 
of its general character, even if we do not apprehend in some pure and therefore undeniable 
universal sense, an object of consciousness. “To distance oneself from oneself and from one’s 
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private purposes means to look at these in the way that others see them. This universality is by 
no means a universality of the concept or understanding. This is not a case of a particular being 
determined by a universal…” (Gadamer, 1998, p. 17). Distance from private purposes leads to 
the disinterest that Kant required for us to experience beauty. Private purposes cannot, however, 
become so distant as to remove those parts of an individual’s experience that lead to variations in 
taste. This point is foundational for Berleant who favours an engaged rather than a disinterested 
state.  
What is, then, required to see an art object in a way that can be said to be part of a 
universal way of seeing in an engaged rather than disinterested state? To distance oneself from 
oneself need not lead to a state of disinterestedness in the Kantian sense, nor need it be the 
experience of a concept as universal, which means, as Gadamer claims, it is “not the application 
of the universal but internal coherence is what matters” (Gadamer, 1998, p. 31). Internal 
coherence aligns with Berleant’s notion of engagement, if it is interpreted as including those 
elements of past and private experience that cannot be removed from our present experiences. 
Internal coherence permits structural and sequential universality without rejecting the possibility 
of differences in outcome. Like form, internal coherence can be understood in more than one 
way: the visual and compositional coherence that, in Passmore’s terms (1951, p. 333), causes an 
art object to “hang together,” and the conceptual coherence of our collection of past experiences 
and existing ideas, as they come together in our understanding of what an art object means. The 
latter reading of coherence implies that the experience of art is of a connection between ideas 
within the frame of an art object and a viewing subject who gets it, via her understanding of the 
object’s art historical position.  
Does this understanding of coherence, which fits the way we experience some objects of 
Conceptual art, mean that we require some knowledge of the object’s art historical situation to 
understand art? If so, how would our need to know how an art object is situated impact the role 
played by form in our experience of art? I do not think that such knowledge is essential to 
coherence generally although it may be essential to a specific and antiformalist understanding of 
art. A Modernist formalist would argue for the understanding of coherence in which knowledge 
is inessential and it is merely the formal properties of a piece that must “hang together.” This 
position draws support from Kant since, as Gadamer points out, “Kant’s main concern ... was to 
give aesthetics an autonomous basis freed from the criterion of the concept, and not to raise the 
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question of truth in the sphere of art, but to base aesthetic judgment on the subjective a priori of 
our feeling of life, the harmony of our capacity for “knowledge in general,” which is the essence 
of both taste and genius” (Gadamer, 1998, p. 59-60).  
From my perspective, the understanding of coherence that applies to both conceptual and 
perceptual art is one that connects the art object not to the truth or knowledge of a specific art 
historical situation, but to our capacity for knowledge in general of the world as it is given to 
perception. My position is supported by the work of Berleant, who does not seek to derive an 
objective truth or some foundational knowledge from the aesthetic any more than Kant did. For 
Berleant, we experience the aesthetic because we are connected to it through our experience of 
an engaged rather than a disinterested consciousness. For Berleant, that we experience the 
aesthetic when “engaged” requires some connection to our capacity for knowledge of our own 
subjective, social and historical place in the world. The social and historical forces that create 
what Berleant calls our “filters”49 condition the experience that we have of any object. These 
filters allow us to experience objects of what Berleant calls the engaged consciousness. Since the 
distance between the aesthetic experience and our consciousness of an object, as I claimed 
earlier, consists of value, the filters that allow our consciousness to be experienced as engaged 
are themselves deeply connected to value and meaning. Gadamer claims “life objectifies itself in 
structures of meaning,” the understanding of which comes from “translating the objectifications 
of life back into”50 that from which they emerged. The objectifications of life are, from my 
perspective, the concepts we employ to make sense or use of what we intuit in the world around 
us. From my perspective, in Conceptual art, the structures of meaning are represented by the 
context while the art objects, or implied art objects, represent the objectifications of life. I believe 
that seeing Conceptual art in this way, as connected to experience through both the given and the 
structures of meaning, shows us the filters through which we experience our consciousness of 
objects. By this I mean that Conceptual art need not be reduced to conceptual properties, nor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 “Acknowledging that the aesthetic begins and ends in sense experience, we can at least on principle consider 
aesthetically any object and any experience that can be sensed. (next para) At the same time it is essential to 
recognize that there is no such thing as pure perception. All sensory perception passes inevitably through the 
multiple filters of culture and meaning: the concepts and structures supplied by language and the meanings instilled 
by culture.” (Berleant, 2010, p. 27) 
50 Gadamer, quoting Dilthey claims: “Since life objectifies itself in structures of meaning, all understanding of 
meaning consists in “translating the objectifications of life back into the spiritual life from which they emerged.” 
Thus the concept of experience is the epistemological basis for all knowledge of the objective” (Gadamer, 1998, p. 
66). 
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Modernist art reduced to perceptual properties, if the sense of coherence we refer to is coherence 
between an art object and the forms of life with which we are engaged, rather than between the 
art object and a particular set of formal properties. The forms of life with which we are engaged 
are, in this sense of coherence, experienced through our consciousness of an object as art, but 
also as a unique and isolated, singularly occurrent event in time and space. This instance of the 
particular is not of a sort that is subsumable under a universal concept in the Kantian schema: 
“the relationship of life to experience is not that of a universal to a particular. Rather, the unity of 
experience as determined by its intentional content stands in an immediate relationship to the 
whole, to the totality of life” (Gadamer, 1998, p. 68). The totality of life includes the mess of 
intuitions that are conditioned by our intentional relationship with objects that are about 
something, as is the case with objects that we experience as art. 
 As I claimed earlier, it is inaccurate to ground any understanding of the aesthetic 
experience in a theory of pure perception, according to both Gadamer and Berleant.51 Neither 
author sees pure perception, stripped of considerations concerning meaning, as realizable. The 
problem, for those like myself who wish to show that unity or coherence, rather than the 
separation, of meaning and form in the aesthetic experience is possible, involves reconciling 
what makes it possible to experience anything at all with what it is to experience an object of 
perception in a way that is, admittedly, as materially indeterminate and contextually dependent 
as objects of art. For Berleant, the answer is simple: “All sensory perception passes inevitably 
through the multiple filters of culture and meaning: the concepts and structures supplied by 
language and the meanings instilled by culture” (Berleant, 2010, p. 27). If we cannot perceive an 
object in the absence of these filters, then we are in the constant possession of an infrastructure 
of which we need not have a determinate conceptual understanding but of which we can be, 
presumably to varying degrees, aware. We would have no means of effecting change or acting 
freely were we not capable of the sort of cultural self-reflexive awareness that includes the 
infrastructural filters Berleant is interested in. We would likely not be making or experiencing art 
in the complex and varied ways that we have throughout history and across cultures were we 
unable to see some, although perhaps not a complete picture, of our own filters.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 “it is essential to recognize that there is no such thing as pure perception.” (Berleant, 2010, p. 27) 
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2.5 The Aboutness of Form 
From a Modernist formalist perspective the aboutness of form in art is restricted to an object’s 
frame, materiality and composition. If art can only be about its formal properties, our experience 
of the art object cannot include the filters that characterize what Berleant calls an engaged 
consciousness. From my perspective, we can never fully disengage our consciousness because, 
as Gadamer rightly claims, pure perception is merely an artificially reductive abstraction.52 We 
cannot, then, apprehend an object as art without the filters of language, culture and context. If 
this is the case, which I believe it is, the two primary assumptions on which Modernist formalism 
is built, that art is, first, fundamentally aesthetic and, second, autonomous from any contextual 
concerns, are not consistent with what it is like to experience art. By the Modernist account, we 
experience the aesthetic only in those instances when the object we apprehend is particular rather 
than general, so that our experience is not of the associations or concepts bound up with the art 
object. Such an experience requires that we have a direct, immediate and pre-conceptual 
apprehension of the object. For this to be the case, perception must be naked, and we must bring 
nothing with us apart from our intuition of an object’s form. This approach restricts our 
understanding and experience of art to a set of autonomous and formal properties while requiring 
that consciousness be disinterested and unconditioned by the desires of the viewing subject.  
The experience of an object as art, after Modernism, is a distinct response to our 
consciousness of an object that is abstracted from its customary purpose53 and that embodies 
meaning. Form as an intentional object can be experienced aesthetically rather than as a 
determinate concept precisely because of the distance between our consciousness and our 
experience of that same object. Viewing form as an intentional object rather than following the 
art critical path of a reductive interpretation of form retains the connection between our 
consciousness of an object that embodies meaning, and the experience of an object as art. The 
experience of art, if we accept it as non-referential, is inclusive of the various elements of the 
object of that experience. The experience of art in both Modernist formalism and Conceptual art, 
in so far as both movements can be generalized into sets of theoretical assumptions that underpin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 “Pure seeing and pure hearing are dogmatic abstractions that artificially reduce phenomena” (Gadamer, 1998, p. 
92) 
53 “form seems to be a mere abstraction from the concept of purpose, which is located neither in the realm of nature 
(visible) nor the realm of freedom (intelligible).” (Freydberg, 2000, p. 80) 
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both their related bodies of criticism and art objects, is entirely referential. The experience of art 
is incidental to that of form in the case of the former and of the idea in the latter.  
Art objects embody meaning because they come into being through a process of decision-
making, in terms of both conceptual content and material form. As embodied meaning, art 
objects show the intent of an artist to make something visible and create an experience, which 
Gasché called the conceptual blueprint54 that art shows and nature does not. The presence of a 
conceptual blueprint need not justify an art object’s judgment or even interpretation by its intent, 
although such criteria often underpinned judgments and interpretations made during studio art 
critiques I attended. I agree with Gadamer who claimed, “The mensauctoris is not admissible as 
a yardstick for the meaning of a work of art. Even the idea of a work-in-itself, divorced from its 
constantly renewed reality in being experienced, always has something abstract about it” 
(Gadamer, 1998, p. xxxi). I take this to mean that an artist’s intent cannot help us determine the 
correct meaning of an art object. This is to say that the artist has no greater monopoly on the 
meaning of an art object than the viewer because meaning is ever changing and cannot be 
determined, but can only be experienced.55 What is always abstract about the work-in-itself, by 
which I take Gadamer to mean a truly autonomous art object that does not live through the eyes 
of a viewing subject, is the indeterminacy of the form of an object that is about something.56 
Since there remains something always abstract about an art object, it can never be a complete or 
total embodiment of an artist’s intent. Once created, the object becomes embodied meaning and 
autonomous object, so that the former cannot be neatly separated from the latter, although both 
Conceptual art and Modernist formalism attempted to separate embodied meaning from 
autonomous object.57   
The acknowledgement that intent plays a role in the making of art objects can help us to 
understand our experience of art if we think of art objects as embodying meaning. However, 
knowledge of an artist’s specific intent ultimately, does little to help us understand what it is like 
54 The difference between art and nature, and the reason that art cannot be the object of a reflective aesthetic 
judgment as nature can, is the finality and determining end required for “the “doing” of art” … “unlike the effects of 
works of art, those of nature do not evidence any conceptual blueprint.” (Gasché, 2003, p. 181-182) 
55 “the aesthetics of genius has done important preparatory work in showing that the experience of the work of art 
always fundamentally surpasses any subjective horizon.” (Gadamer, 1998, p. xxxi) 
56 What Gadamer means by "abstract" is far more complicated than is relevant to explore here. I am interested 
in Gadamer’s avoidance of a representational or conceptual account of what lies beyond the given and our 
apprehension of it, which contrasts with Kant’s aesthetics and aligns with Berleant’s engaged consciousness. 
57 “I go so far as to assert that the act of understanding, including the experience of the work of art, surpasses all 
historicism in the sphere of aesthetic experience” (Gadamer, 1998, p. xxx). 
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to experience art as embodying meaning. We are not helped by knowing the specific intent of an 
artist because meaning in art involves a set of complex, contextually dependent conditions, out of 
which an art object is crafted and from the perspective of which it is viewed. The specific intent 
of an artist may be included in the conditions that are involved in an art object’s meaning, but 
intent is not significant to our understanding of the experience of art in and of itself. What is of 
significance is that we apprehend an art object as about something and, therefore, as an object 
that embodies meaning. For the Modernist formalists, art could only be about its material and 
composition, so that representational content was aesthetically insignificant. Meaning, 
particularly if our apprehension of meaning relies on knowledge of context and the shared 
recognition of representational content, is distinct from form in the Modernist formalist view. 
From my perspective, however, we may better understanding our experience of art by looking at 
the ways in which form and meaning are conjoined. One of the ways an art object’s material 
form remains connected to meaning is through art’s conceptual blueprint. The connection, from 
my perspective, is that form, as a structural part of our consciousness of objects, is itself an 
intentional object. The form of an art object, unlike the knowledge we may have of an art 
object’s origins or context, is not subsumed under a universal concept, yet must still be 
apprehended as the form of something. So, it is not the specific intent that is significant, but the 
aboutness of form – its connection to intentionality, which lends itself to our experience of art 
objects as embodying meaning. 
Intentionality, as the aboutness or directedness of conscious states, requires the presence 
of an object of which we may be conscious and to which we may attribute some belief or other 
mental phenomena. Brentano claims “intentionality defines the distinction between the mental 
and the physical; all and only mental phenomena exhibit intentionality.”58 The form of an art 
object exhibits intentionality since it can only exist to us as the form of something. The form of 
something is not, from my perspective, merely the form of an object’s material boundaries, in the 
case of art. Art itself exists as a result of human effort and ideas; states that exhibit intentionality 
and that are not material things in the world. From my perspective, art is neither explicitly mental 
nor physical – it occupies a space inclusive of the two in which we perceive an object that we 
may apprehend as about something. Our consciousness is directed at both the perceptual (the 
object itself) and conceptual (the idea) art object. This is to say that art as an object of perception 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd Edition, 2006 
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cannot be apprehended in isolation from its embodied meaning, and the form of the art object 
cannot be found by reducing its properties to either the idea or the autonomous object. Our 
experience of art, then, allows us to perceive an object that embodies meaning about the human 
world that exists not as a representation of polished and final concepts or, in the case of 
formalism, as an object of disinterested perception, but as an expanded range of possible 
experiences. 
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Chapter Three – Form and its detractors 
3.1 The Absence of Form 
Modernist formalism was too rigid to respond to changes in the making and material 
manifestation of art, some of which came as a response by artists to formalism’s own theoretical 
implications. As a result of Modernist formalism’s lack of theoretical viability in response to 
new ways of making art, the art critical conversation shifted from the form of abstract 
expressionism to the formlessness of Conceptual art. Form was, however, not lost in the adoption 
of formlessness by Conceptual artists, since the making of formless or anti-formal art cannot be 
done without reference to the form that is negated or denied. The work of artists like Joseph 
Kosuth appears to deny form any role in our perception or apprehension of art while other artists, 
particularly Adrian Piper and Sol LeWitt, rejected formalist assumptions about our experience of 
art, but were nevertheless open to making art that, from my perspective, retained and 
acknowledged the form of an art object. 
The art installations put together by Joseph Kosuth can be considered conceptual rather 
than perceptual because they rely far less on the presence of what an audience would generally 
understand to be art objects than they do on text and purposive objects that appear to represent 
nothing other than their definition.59 An example of this is Kosuth’s One and Three series, which 
consists of household objects (such as chairs) next to life-sized photos and a text panel with a 
definition of each object. In the case of such an installation, our experience of art is not an 
experience of the object. LeWitt and Piper also used language and text in making their art, less 
so LeWitt than Piper. In contrast to Kosuth, neither Le Witt nor Piper made art that was 
experienced through the literal meaning of the text used in an installation. In One and Three, the 
object is demonstrative of the text, so that its inclusion is, from my perspective, incidental to the 
installation rather than representative of the text or integral to our perceptual experience of the 
installation.  
Whereas Kosuth uses language and text to remove the form of an art object from our 
experience of art, which is one reason Conceptual art can be described as anti-formal, the work 
of LeWitt and Piper uses language to draw us into the experience of experiencing an art object as 
about something. In this way, from my perspective, the work of Conceptual artists like LeWitt 
and Piper show us the connection between the perceptual and conceptual forms of art through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 http://www.wikipaintings.org/en/joseph-kosuth/one-and-three-lamps 
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our conjoined experience of both. In fact, Freydberg claims, because every object is constituted 
by form, the negation of form is necessary for the appearance of any object: “Since a relation to 
darkness and unconsciousness belong to the very nature of imagination, all forming is connected 
with anti-form. Thus the appearance of any object requires darkness and withdrawal in order to 
take place at all” (Freydberg, 2000, p. 76). The process of forming, which is an unavoidable part 
of the experience of form in the visual arts, Freydberg claims, “involves an intertwining of 
reason and unreason. Even as form structures and orders, an indispensible element which is non-
structure and dis-order is at play” (Freydberg, 2000, p. 77). From my perspective, Conceptual 
artists like LeWitt and Piper, made art that not only reacted against Modernist formalism, but 
also represents the idea that form requires its antithesis to exist at all, although I do not think this 
was their intent. 
In fact, the idea that a certain kind of negativity is constitutive of positive reality goes 
back at least to Hegel and is very important in 20th century phenomenology. For instance, Jean 
Paul Sartre connects the idea of negation with representation. In his book The Imaginary, Sartre 
points out that the image of an object or a person known to exist is precisely the absence or 
negation of that thing’s or person’s presence, rather than an absolute state of nonexistence.60 A 
thing that cannot exist can neither be conceived of nor imagined as existing, which means that 
we must have some point of reference at which we may start if we are to imagine either the lack 
or the presence of a thing that is given to our senses. Certain advocates of anti-formal and anti-
aesthetic Conceptual art understand the absence of form uncritically. Anti-formalism becomes 
elevated to dogma, just as the visual purity of Modernist Formalists had been taken as a creed. 
Both Conceptual artists and formalists failed to perceive how form and absence of form are 
interwoven to create experience and how absence is important to indicate presence.  
60 I am referring to Section I. Consciousness and Imagination, p. 79-188 of Sartre’s The imaginary : a 
phenomenological psychology of the imagination (2004), but primarily to p. 183 and the passage concerning the 
image of Charles VIII: “It is in the very nature of consciousness to be intentional and a consciousness that ceased to 
be consciousness of something would thereby cease to exist. But consciousness must be able to form and posit 
objects affected by a certain character of nothingness in relation to the totality of reality. One can recall, in fact, that 
the imaginary object can be posited as nonexistent or as absent or as existing elsewhere or not be posited as 
existent. … We therefore see that in order to produce the object ‘Charles VIII’ as imaged, consciousness must be 
able to deny the reality of the picture, and that it could deny this reality only by standing back from reality grasped 
in its totality. To posit an image is to constitute an object in the margin of the totality of the real, it is therefore to 
hold the real at a distance, to be freed from it, in a word, to deny it.”  
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Freydberg provides a more satisfying account of the respective roles of form and anti-
form. He sees a connection between not only the presence of an object of consciousness and its 
absence, but between absence of form and presence of form as a way of seeing. He claims:   
“Absence “belongs” to form insofar as the images are simply present as mere images. 
Whether it is thought as the absence of direct originality in the apprehension of things, or 
as the merely partial determination of a thing by its means, or (more radically) as the 
lurking presence of a dark element in all apprehension which nevertheless allows the 
thing to show itself from itself as it conceals its inner essence, form always occurs as 
juxtaposed with its other, with anti-form. Without the abiding presence of this other-than-
form, no forming could take place at all” (Freydberg, 2000, p. 85).  
 
The ability to fill an absence with the presence of an image allows us to escape the limitations of 
what is immediately given to our senses, so that we may be capable of imagining, remembering, 
and constructing that part of our encounter with the world that is meaningful and can become art. 
Because an imagining, a memory, or a hallucination is impoverished in the absence of its actual 
object, we cannot fully experience art without an object for our consciousness to confront.  
In our experience of art, absence belongs to form in Freydberg’s sense. Absence allows 
us to construct the presence of what is not immediately given to the senses. The act of forming in 
the presence of what Freydberg calls other-than-form is at work when we experience art that 
requires some understanding of context. From the perspective of a Modernist formalist, the 
experience of representational paintings is not aesthetic because it is not the experience of an 
object we perceive, but rather of the thing represented. In the case of an abstract expressionist 
painting like Autumn Rhythm (Number 30), 1950, by Jackson Pollock, the Modernist formalist 
would say that we experience what is immediately given to the senses and nothing else, which 
distinguishes our experience of the aesthetic from any other sort of experience. However, I take 
the position that, since we cannot perceive an object of art as pure and immediately present form, 
we must allow form to play a role that is not limited to what we perceive as present, and that 
incorporates our understanding of context and meaning in art.  
The notion of anti-form was not included in the Modernist formalist account of our 
experience of art, which contributed to its proponents’ inability to find the connection between 
meaning and form, and cope with the strain placed on the theory’s claims by Conceptual art. The 
experience of Conceptual art begins with an idea that guides the making, selecting or designating 
of a material object yet remains absent from our perception. Regardless of whether an 
installation is considered conceptual, the experience of an object as art, from my perspective, 
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requires both the “abiding presence of this other-than-form” and our perception of the object. 
The form of art, if it consists also of absence in Freydberg’s sense, allows us access to a fleeting 
understanding of what it is to be human and to experience meaning in the world around us. From 
my perspective, we experience form in art through our apprehension of an object in the absence 
of a concept, with the recognition that we are beings for whom “pure” perception is not 
achievable, and who apprehend the world through an engaged consciousness. This is to say; the 
social and historical conditions that lend an art object its form of life are present in the 
consciousness of a subject who experiences an object as art.  
The connection of form to anti-form, and the act of forming that follows from this 
connection, is consistent with Berleant’s view of consciousness as engaged. The world we 
inhabit is not such that we are passive viewers who only perceive the presence of what is given 
to the senses. From my perspective, our experience of art is paradigmatic of the act of forming 
our consciousness of objects in a way that is not pure in its perception, but is engaged. If our 
consciousness of objects is engaged, the act of forming that takes place in our experience of art is 
an act that connects the loosely associated and less determinate concepts we have accumulated 
(which is constitutive of context) to our apprehension of an art object. Modernist formalists were 
right in noting that art objects do have unchanging aspects that can be seen in a specific way 
even if they are connected to a specific meaning, and I agree that the physical aspects of an art 
object come to life in ways that cannot be fully contained by the artist’s original idea. However, 
our experience of an art object and the meaning that emerges from this experience is formed not 
only by our perception of the object but also by the context in which we as viewing subjects are 
situated. It is here, the point at which context and object are experienced as a unified whole, that 
the form of an art object is most closely tied to anti-form.  
The experience of form in art is not the singular experience of our pure perception of a 
Jackson Pollock nor is it the experience of precisely the idea of a text as art, for instance, 
intended by a Conceptual artist. In forming our consciousness of an object as art, we experience 
form and anti-form as unified but not universal. Since the object cannot determine the conditions 
of its own forming, yet remains an object that consists of unchanging (unless altered or damaged) 
physical aspects, variation in the particular meaning formed by a viewing subject does not lead 
to, as Gadamer claims, a disintegration of the work “into the changing aspects of itself so that it 
would lose all identity, but it is there in them all. ... Thus we have the task of interpreting the 
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work of art in terms of time” (Gadamer, 1998, p. 121). From my perspective, to interpret an art 
object in terms of time, is to acknowledge the context in which we and the art object are situated 
and through which our consciousness of an object as art is formed. The fluid relationship 
between the form and the conditions that connect an object to its life as art remain intact, without 
an artificial reduction of an art object to either its changing aspects (for instance, Kosuth’s view 
of our experience of art as only conceptual), or unchanging aspects (the Modernist formalist 
view of our experience of art as purely aesthetic and about only the object we perceive). 
In this section, I have shown that form is not simply the form of something as it is given 
to the senses, but also its absence as anti-form. Form and anti-form are connected, and the 
connection of the two is consistent with a view of consciousness that is engaged rather than 
disinterested. By including absence in my account, form in our experience of art remains present 
even if we are presented with an art installation that is intended to be anti-formal or immaterial. 
Neither Modernist formalists nor Conceptual artists considered the connection between form and 
anti-form in their accounts of our experience of art, which, from my perspective, weakens both 
accounts. In the next section, I will explain why this is the case and give examples of 
installations that have attempted to create an immaterial experience of art.    
3.2 Form in the Empty Gallery 
The meaning of a Conceptual art installation can, conceivably, be experienced without ever 
viewing the art object or installation itself, particularly in the case of exhibits that are curated 
through the lens of philosophically informed theory.61 One can, therefore, enter a gallery space, 
read the curatorial statement, and leave with the impression that one experienced the exhibit as 
art without seeing it. The experience of a curatorial statement as art is, from my perspective, the 
experience of an absence that lacks a corresponding presence. The experience of an art exhibit, 
in the case I described, is of what Gasché referred to as a conceptual blueprint (Gasché, 2003, p. 
181-182). I think a Conceptual artist like Joseph Kosuth would say that the experience of art is 
only ever the experience of an idea, so the exhibit itself becomes vestigial since it is no longer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 An excellent example of a exhibit that could be described as curated through such a lens is “And Another Thing,” 
2011, curated by Katherine Behar and Emmy Mikelson. The curatorial statement claims, “Anthropocentrism is the 
name for this ontological lynchpin that binds together centuries of art, philosophy, social theory, and scientific 
inquiry. The current exhibition, And Another Thing, is part of an alternate movement toward non-anthropocentrism, 
an effort to dislodge the human from the center of discussion, to enrich the concept of being, and to open the very 
world itself to all things that comprise it.” The full statement can be read online here: 
http://andanotherthingexhibition.wordpress.com/curatorial-statement/ . 
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required. If this is the case, it is because the curatorial statement makes explicit the conceptual 
blueprint of an art exhibit so that knowledge of the blueprint replaces, or at least becomes a 
necessary part of what it is like, to experience an art installation. It is my position, however, that 
the curatorial statement cannot replace the physical presence of the installation as the object of 
our experience of art. Even our experience of an empty gallery as art is of the gallery itself, since 
the absence of objects in the presence of the space plays a role in forming that experience. This is 
to say that, as Gasché claims, “Form is always the form of something, and, in principle, cannot 
be thought independently” (Gasché, 2003, p. 8). In the case of the 1972 installation Air 
Conditioning Show,62 by Art & Language, which consisted of precisely the absence of a form 
that could readily be understood as art, absence becomes the form of the installation manifest in 
the blank walls, cool temperature and visually empty gallery space. 
The conjunction of a theoretical statement and a physically present object experienced as 
art is a unified experience such that, even in response to something like the Air Conditioning 
Show, is of the installation as a phenomenal whole. The experience is of a whole in two senses: it 
is the unification of an art object’s conceptual blue print with its sensible form, and it is the 
connection between the object and the subject who is experiencing it as art. To separate the 
object from the conceptual blueprint leads to a reductive account of what it is like to experience 
an object as art. The experience of art as a phenomenal whole gets at what it is like to experience 
form in art as both present and absent, in Freydberg’s sense. Freydberg claims, “the form of the 
whole represents a notion beyond any possible experience and beyond any show of being bound 
up with possible experience” (Freydberg, 2000, p. 99). The form of art, in this sense, is inclusive 
of an absence that cannot be directly or immediately experienced and is essentially 
indeterminate. For Freydberg, absence is the “provocative form”, which relies on the notion that, 
as he claims, “the forms are ways of seeing, residing on the cusp of the visible” (Freydberg, 
2000, p. 23). From my perspective, form in our experience of art sits on the cusp of the visible in 
so far as it includes not only what is given to the senses but also what is absent. So, form in our 
experience of art is, as Freydberg claims, a way of seeing an object as both what it is and what it 
is not.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Art & Language, The Air Conditioning Show (1972) consisted of an empty gallery space kept at a controlled room 
temperature. 
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For the engaged consciousness, form as a way of seeing is not our immediate 
apprehension of the appearance of an object. Form is, in this sense, a combination of what was 
referred to earlier as the unchanging aspects and changing aspects of an object. Freydberg 
claims: “Even granting the view that the forms are purely intelligible objects, they have their 
importance not as isolated supersensible beings but in their relation to human knowing” 
(Freydberg 19). So, if form is important in relation to human knowing, it must be so in relation to 
a consciousness that is engaged. The experience of an art installation as art requires the 
apprehension of both the conditions of an engaged consciousness, which relate the form of the 
installation to human knowing, and the physical presence of the art itself. As Gadamer claimed,63 
the art object itself does not lose its identity to shifts in human knowing that change its aspects. 
There remains a need for some sensuous anchor in our experience of art that cannot be entirely 
taken up or filled out by a curatorial or artist’s statement. The proponents of Modernist 
formalism, specifically Bell and Greenberg, failed to see that, as Gasché claims, “formalism 
cannot account for the formation of form” (Gasché, 2003, p. 61). The formation of form in 
experience requires an engaged consciousness that can intuit both the sensible forms of objects in 
the world and the conditioning of perception and consciousness by the social and historical 
situation of a viewing subject.64 
In this section, I have shown that form is a way of seeing, rather than the reductive set of 
an object’s physical properties or the equally reductive form of the idea. I have also shown that 
the subject is engaged in the act of forming her experience of an object as art. Taking the 
position that form is a way of seeing shows how it is that we may experience, for instance, an 
empty gallery space as art. In addition, positing form as a way of seeing is consistent with the 
position that we are actively engaged in the forming of our experience. The assumptions that 
underpin Modernist formalism imply that our experience of art is only of what we directly and 
passively perceive. Alternatively, a Conceptual artist like Joseph Kosuth might say that we need 
perceive nothing at all to experience art since “art only exists conceptually.” Both the positions 
that form is a way of seeing and that we are actively engage in forming our experience contrast 
63 “into the changing aspects of itself so that it would lose all identity, but it is there in them all. ... Thus we have the 
task of interpreting the work of art in terms of time” (Gadamer, 1998, p. 121) 
64 This is not to say that only those who can see, hear, feel, and smell are able to experience the aesthetic, or 
experience art as such. The sensible is, through consciousness and experience, available to a subject in ways that can 
transcend limits imposed by the body through our understanding of the information deliverable by the senses. The 
person who has developed in abject social isolation may, then, be less able to see than the person without sight. 
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with Modernist formalist’s and early Conceptual artists’ reductive accounts of our experience of 
art.  
3.3 Form and Appearance  
In chapter one, I discussed the impact of Modernist formalism’s curator Clement Greenberg on 
art criticism and art making. For Greenberg, the formal properties of an art object provided the 
grounds for an objective judgment of taste. Greenberg’s formalist theory of art relied heavily on 
his interpretation of Kantian aesthetics; in particular, Greenberg was interested in Kant’s idea 
that we must view art with disinterest if we are to experience it aesthetically. By disinterest, Kant 
meant that our disposition when viewing art must be such that we have no desire for the object or 
what it may do for us. My position is that Modernist formalism as a theory of art adopted a view 
of disinterest that included not only a lack of desire but also the lack of a concept associated with 
an object. Modernist formalism as a theory was underpinned by the assumption that the 
experience of art can be reduced to that of an object’s formal properties in isolation of other 
considerations. So, the assumption is that we can perceive an object as only that: an isolated 
percept with no associated concept. For such a stark perceptual experience to be possible, our 
consciousness of an object must be passive. I reject disinterest in art and, therefore, what role 
form may play in our experience of an object as art if form is only the phenomenal form of the 
object’s unchanging aspects. It is my position that the experience of art cannot be entirely 
removed from the subjective conditions that enabled its forming. My position is not consistent 
with Modernist formalist assumptions about art as fundamentally aesthetic and autonomous, and 
I have shown in the former sections of this chapter that I can reject the Modernist formalists’ 
assumptions about our experience of art without rejecting form as impactful on our experience of 
an object as art. I have done so by showing that the question of what role is played by form in 
our experience of art is not a question of the role played by formal properties but is, rather, what 
is the role played by form as a way of seeing in our experience of art. To shift the question, I 
needed to reject the position that we can perceive art with a naked eye as passive subjects and 
adopt the position that consciousness is, as Berleant claims, engaged and active.  
As mentioned earlier, we experience both the changing and unchanging aspects of an 
object as art. The art object’s unchanging aspects are those that have been acted on the least by 
the intervention of a viewing subject. The active intervention by the subject on an art object 
cannot be subtracted, which is to say that the formation of form cannot be undone, without losing 
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sight of form itself. As Rockmore points out, “It is simply not possible to subtract what the 
subject adds to reveal the object prior to any action to it” (Rockmore, 2011, p. 50). Modernist 
formalists such as Greenberg did think it was possible to subtract what the subject added to her 
consciousness of an object, so that her perception of an art object was disinterested, or not 
impinged upon by any interest or conceptual association. Both Bell and Greenberg assumed that 
the only significant, and therefore aesthetically valuable, form that could be found in art must be 
that which refers to nothing but itself. Kantian disinterested pleasure, in which the aesthetic 
judgment is grounded, is experienced in the absence of the interests or desires of the viewing 
subject, contrasts with Berleant’s view of an engaged consciousness as the grounds of an 
aesthetic experience. Disinterest, as a requirement of aesthetic judgment, is a way of recognising 
the extent to which any intuition is intervened on by, as Berleant claims, a subject’s “multiple 
filters of culture and meaning” (Berleant, 2010, 27). To say that consciousness is engaged, 
however, is not to say that it is interested. To take an interest in things in the world, we must 
form a set of assumptions that we arrive at prior to making decisions about how to react to 
objects in the world. We must take a specific interest in certain types of things, and arrive at 
similar decisions about their use and their nature quickly if we are to achieve even the basic end 
of surviving. We can do all of this, however, while remaining aware of the possibility of other 
experiences than the purposive and expedient. Other experiences include what we can refer to as 
aesthetic, and what it is to experience an object as art.  
The active subject apprehends objects in the world as containing the possibility for 
meaning. Art objects, because they are created as objects that are about something, in that they 
refer to some framework of understanding outside of themselves, present a unique case for the 
conscious subject. An art object need not be understood as conforming to a general category in 
which it exists as a particular instance, other than, perhaps, a particular instance of art, for it to be 
about something. The way that an art object appears to us is through the cultural and historical 
filter that allows us to identify an object as art. The art object’s form reveals to us not only what 
it is that we experience as the object of consciousness but also its possibilities for being about 
something. This is not to say, however, that we experience only the possibility of meaning in art 
in a way that is purely conceptual, as Kosuth would say is the case when we experience art. As 
Berleant claims, the experience of art determines an object’s existence as an art object. The 
experience of art, particularly in the case of Conceptual art objects that challenge our definitions 
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of art, is an experience of an object’s appearing as it is, stripped of all its determinations. These 
determinations cannot, however, be entirely removed, which is the position I take on what it is to 
experience art. That we experience an object of consciousness as art because consciousness is 
engaged, rather than taking a disinterested pleasure in the beautiful, from my perspective, more 
accurately captures what it is like to experience art.  
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Conclusion 
The experience of an object as art is of the object and its social and historical context. From my 
perspective, we do not experience an object as art in the absence of these contextual conditions 
that make art possible. This is not to say that the object is irrelevant, or that the concept of form 
plays no role in our experience of art. I maintain that we experience an object as art, which is to 
say the full set of conditions that allow us to experience art include the object and the physical 
space in which it may be situated. However, a reductionist approach to explaining the role played 
by form in our experience of art, which was the approach taken by Modernist formalists like 
Clive Bell and Clement Greenberg, claims only the formal properties of an art object are 
significant. In contrast, Conceptual artists such as Adrian Piper, Joseph Kosuth and others made 
art that was not about formal properties but, rather, about the idea behind the art. It is my 
position that the form of an art object, whether the object is a Jackson Pollock or a performance 
by Conceptual artist Joseph Beuys, can be isolated to neither the formal properties nor the idea 
behind a work. Gadamer claims “it is not at all a question of mere subjective variety of 
conceptions, but of the work’s own possibilities of being that emerge as the work explicates 
itself, as it were, in the variety of its aspects” (Gadamer, 1998, p. 118). The experience of an 
object as art exposes the variety of its aspects as they are determined by our experience, which is 
to say the unchanging aspects of the object come together through our experience with the 
changing aspects of the object’s social and historical situation to form what we experience as art. 
Our experience of an object as art is limited by what is perceptually and contextually available to 
us at any particular time. The perceptual and contextual limits, in conjunction with the work’s 
own possibilities of being, compose the form of the object that we experience as art. 
We typically encounter art as existing in both the physical space that is occupied by the 
object itself - the space within the object’s frame, and the institutional space that imposes 
constraints on our interaction with that object.  Each of these spaces determines some part of our 
experience of the object. This notion of space within a frame can be extended to the writings of 
Paul Crowther who claims, “Pictorial space intervenes on [ordinary visual perception] by 
creating immobile figures which are isomorphic with selected aspects of the shape and mass of 
the subject-matter. In this way, the subject-matter is referred to, but is also, in symbolic terms, as 
it were bracketed off from the phenomenal flow of real time” (Crowther, 2009, p. 43). The art 
object, as Crowther describes it here, stands for those parts of experience that depend on a 
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physical presence. As “‘bracketed off’ from the phenomenal flow of real time,” the subject 
matter reveals to us the changing aspects of our own existence. The unchanging aspects are 
experienced by a subject who is bound to her physical body and connected to an inner life, which 
cannot be removed from her perception, in Berleant’s sense of the engaged consciousness. The 
art object’s unchanging aspects point to the resilience of its physical presence. This is to say, as 
Gadamer claimed, that an art object does “not disintegrate into the changing aspects of itself so 
that it would lose all identity, but it is there in them all” (Gadamer, 1998, p. 121). The varieties 
of an art object’s aspects include the range of experience that is made possible by a viewing 
subject’s engaged consciousness. The life-world that conditions the subject’s engaged 
consciousness of an object that we experience as art shows itself in the object’s form as the 
conjunction of changing and unchanging aspects. Although our consciousness of the object can 
be bracketed from the phenomenal flow of life that would determine what an object is to us, we 
cannot separate our experience of it as art from the conditions that make consciousness and the 
construction of a life-world possible. This is to say that we cannot experience an object as art if 
our consciousness is not active or, as Berleant claims, engaged.  
We require a way of being conscious of the world that can find the point at which the 
changing and unchanging aspects of an art object converge since, as Crowther claims, “the image 
not only represents its content but at the same time exemplifies something of the most general 
structure of the human condition itself – namely consciousness’s correlation with, and 
emergence from, a physical body” (Crowther, 2009, p. 27). Our consciousness emerges from a 
physical body, and this relationship is an irreducible part of the way we experience the objects 
given in the world around us. This is part of the reason that our experience of Conceptual art - as 
being about an idea, remains connected to our experience of an object as art. Just as our 
understanding of conscious experience is diminished by the absence of an account of the role 
played by our own physical existence, focusing exclusively on the concept or intended meaning 
of an art object impoverishes our experience by failing to account for the role played by the 
unchanging aspects of physical presence. No single aspect of our experience of art can be cut 
away without undoing the whole. Crowther expresses the same point by claiming, “For if a 
context of theory is taken to be the main determinant of artistic meaning and value, this does not 
explain what makes art worth theorizing about in the first place” (Crowther, 2009, p. 120, 
italicized in original).  One part of what makes art worth theorizing about at all is the way in 
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which our experience of it can be, or perhaps simply is, bracketed from our experience of other 
objects in the world. Objects that we may quickly subsume under a general concept can, but 
often do not, lend themselves to such an experience, unless we are presented with a sort of 
intervention in the way that we typically experience purposive objects.  
The gallery as a cultural institution, and such social and historical contexts that condition 
our consciousness of art objects, provide such an intervention. Art as revealing the unseen - the 
“absence” of ideas and ways of being that do not present themselves as determinate and 
purposive - has become, I argue, a normative institutional presentation since Conceptual art 
began as a movement. For the viewing subject, the art object, as a created or chosen object that is 
understood to embody meaning, is experienced in ways that are not exclusively conceptual 
because the object is itself a physical presence. The object’s presence cannot be reduced to the 
idea behind its making without breaking the connection between our consciousness of the object 
and what it, as Crowther claims above, “exemplifies of the most general structure of the human 
condition itself.” Our experience of art is, as Gadamer claims, “no longer just something that 
flows past quickly in the stream of conscious life; it is meant as a unity and thus attains a new 
mode of being one” (Gadamer, 1998, p. 66, italics original). Form in art is the conjunction of the 
changing aspects of art, on which the subject intervenes, with the unchanging aspects of the 
object we experience as art. Form allows us to experience art as bracketed from the regular flow 
of phenomenal space and time, which is why we experience art at all, regardless of its style.  
To experience an object as art, we must be able to apprehend, in Berleant’s sense, 
through an act of engaged consciousness, both the changing and unchanging aspects of the 
object. Our engaged consciousness is conditioned by the social and historical context in which 
we are situated and through which we apprehend an object’s changing and unchanging aspects. 
The conjunction of changing and unchanging aspects is the form of an object we experience as 
art. It is, then, my conclusion that form plays the role of enabling our experience of that object as 
art. Form is the meeting point between what we bring with us to our experience of objects in the 
world and what is given to our senses by those objects in the world. Without an account of the 
role played by form, we would experience only the objects as they are given and not as art. 
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